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ABSTRACT
As presidential candidates rhetorically articulate their beliefs during presidential debates, they
reveal a lot about their underlying ideological beliefs. These beliefs were examined through the
lens of an established methodology called the Operational Code, which uses a program to
decipher a candidate’s beliefs through what they say in debate transcripts. In this study, the belief
trends of the Operational Codes of all presidential candidates from 1976-2012 were examined
through a rhetorical lens, and it was found that rhetoric was indeed the driving force for the
apparent changes in Operational Code beliefs. These changes were examined on a greater level
of detail through four case studies, which illustrated the changes in Operational Code beliefs and
rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, the incumbent presidential candidates, the 2004 election, and lastly,
with the independent presidential candidates.
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INTRODUCTION
Every four years, the American electorate is given the challenging task of electing a
president. In the American political climate, this time of the year means much more than a just a
change between leadership. According to James Barber (1977), the Presidency is “much more
than an institution” (4). The attitude held towards the presidency is much different from that of
Congress, because “the president is a symbolic leader, the one figure who draws together
people’s hopes and fears for the political future” (Barber, 1977, 4). Belief systems and ideologies
are the driving force in presidential elections. Therefore, when Americans step up to the ballot
box to vote for President, they are not just voting for the candidate, but the set of beliefs that he
carries with him.
To do that, voters must envision how a variety of presidential candidates and their beliefs
would guide their decisions as President of the United States, if elected. From a psychological
standpoint, every time a candidate speaks or makes an appearance, he is being judged by voters
in areas of “character, leadership, and judgment” (Renshon, 1998, 377). On the campaign trail,
candidates speak about their beliefs non-stop, their words rhetorically crafted in one way or
another to appeal to American voters. With every word that the candidates say, they are exposing
their belief systems to the public. Their words are a representation of their beliefs, and their
beliefs are a testament to the articulations of their ideals.
To study this relationship between rhetoric and belief systems in American presidential
elections, we must first find a way to analyze the belief systems of presidential candidates. The
link between leaders’ behaviors and their personality traits is not only subject to scrutiny by
1

voters, but also by political scientists and psychoanalysts. Alexander George (1969) argues that
while analysts are interested in simplifying and structuring the complex world of political actors,
this type of study is essential for the political actor himself as well, as “he too must somehow
comprehend complex situations in order to decide how to best deal with them” (200).
A candidate’s beliefs highly contribute to his character and personality, and vice versa
(Barber, 1977). According to Barber (1977), a president's personality 1) shapes his behavior in
"nontrivial matters" (6), 2) is one that is patterned and consistent and 3) is shaped not only by
internal factors, but external environmental factors dominant at the time of his leadership. While
Barber’s findings are definitive, his methods severely lack standardization, as Barber believes
that the best way to predict presidential character is to “see how they [a president’s motives and
beliefs] were put together in the first place” (Barber, 1977, 6). This involves an examination of a
president’s childhood, their leadership experiences, self-esteem, motives, etc. In addition, Barber
(1977) himself admits that “character provides the main thrust and broad direction—but it does
not determine, in any fixed sense, world view and style” (11). In a country where rhetoric itself
transforms the face of our political climate, a highly qualitative and controversial method like
Barber’s would prove results too ambiguous as a measure of candidates’ belief systems.
A well-established methodology called the Operational Code easily fills this gap.
According to Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003), the Operational Code is more reliable than
Barber’s methods because the Code works off of “motivational biases rather than simply the
products of lessons learned from changing experiences in the political universe” (221). In
addition, the Operational Code serves as a “useful ‘bridge’ or ‘link’ to psychodynamic
interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems and their role in behavior under
2

different conditions” (George, 1969, 195). This methodology quantitatively analyzes speech
transcripts in order to examine a leader’s belief system.
In summary, the Operational Code represents an actor’s beliefs at the psychoanalytic
level—why they believe what they say, the rationality and motivation for what they do. This
research method has had significant findings in researching international leaders and their
impacts of foreign policy (Walker, 2000). Surprisingly, however, this interest has not widely
transferred over to the study of presidential candidates as a group. When these methodologies are
used for assessing presidents or presidential candidates, they only focus on presidential rhetoric
that spans from the time the leaders first entered and left office, or concentrate on the analysis of
one particular candidate during his presidential campaign (Renshon, 1998; Schafer & Crichlow,
2000; Walker & Falkowski, 1984; Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998, 2003). Lastly, the
Operational Code has never been used to examine the relationship between the articulations of a
leader’s beliefs in relation to the rhetorical situation of the changing political climate.
The purpose of this study was to use an established methodology to answer a new
question: What do the beliefs of presidential candidates reveal about the rhetoric of our everchanging political climate?
Why Presidential Candidates?
As mentioned earlier, the Operational Code is not typically used to study presidential
candidates, per say, but the method surely has the potential to reveal a great deal of new
information about presidential candidates and their in-group comparisons. The Operational Code
reveals a presidential candidate’s belief system, which gives a deeper, even a more subconscious, view of his beliefs than what is exposed by his party’s ideology. If a presidential
3

candidate exhibits these beliefs through his speech during presidential debates, this can be used
by the American electorate as a predictor to how they will act and behave in the White House.
Additionally, presidential candidates are an ideal group of what Margaret Hermann
(2003) would call a “norming group” (17). First of all, the leaders in this group are competing
against each other for the same job, the President of the United States. Secondly, each of them
have a considerable amount of experience that qualifies them to run for this position, which
means that they have all had a significant amount of time to develop their beliefs. By comparing
their Operational Codes, we will be able to determine what beliefs these candidates planned to
bring with them to the White House.
Why Presidential Debates?
Even though there are many different kinds of texts that one could use to study
presidential candidates, presidential debates are actually ideal because of their natural format and
dynamics. Televised presidential debates are a medium through which candidates can express
themselves in an environment that is fair game—in other words, it’s ultimately the candidates
who are competing on the debate floor, not their fundraisers, their field organizers, or their
volunteers. Additionally, the debates themselves provide the candidates a uniform speaking
format where all major candidates get the chance to speak in the same forms, such as opening
and closing statements, rebuttals, etc. In addition, a study by Schafer and White (2007)
confirmed that content analysis of transcripts work best in situations where “the individual is
speaking spontaneously under moderate stress levels” (42).
The unsettling dynamics of a debate keep the format a lively one. It’s no secret that
candidates are vigorously prepared for their debates weeks ahead of time. By the time they
4

candidates reach the debate floor, they have already practiced ways to answer every question and
give every answer. Even with all of that preparation, however, each candidate still has the
looming potential to have a disastrous night. It seems, that no matter how prepared a presidential
candidate is, anything and everything can happen.
It is for these reasons why presidential debates are the ideal text to study for this type of
content analysis. Based off of Hermann’s guidelines, presidential debates contain a perfect
mixture of planned and spontaneous speech (1998). According to Hermann, planned speeches or
public statements pre-written by a leader and his speech writers “reflect what the leader wants,
and is pledging, to be,” (as cited in Hermann, 1998, 5). More “off-the-cuff” speech, on the other
hand, is more spontaneous, as “leaders must respond quickly without props or aid” (Hermann,
2003, 179). This type of speech can give insight as to what the leader is really like in his private
life and behind closed doors (Hermann, 2003). Hermann (2003) also emphasizes the importance
of analyzing full, complete texts, as we are interested in the behavior of the leader, not the slant
that a reporter might try to create when editing the tapes of an interview. The natural format of
presidential debates gives us a perfect combination of planned speech and spontaneous speech, in
its full text.
The Operational Code – The History
Over a period of about sixty years, the Operational Code has been transformed as a
methodology. Since Leites (1953) published his work on the Operational Code of the Politburo
in 1953, there have been numerous improvements to the methodology of using the Operational
Code. Unlike Barber’s (1977) idea to study a political leader’s childhood in order to determine
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their character, the Operational Code has been heavily institutionalized; developing theory,
typologies, and methods for execution over time.
Nathan Leites (1953) first used the operational code in “A Study of Bolshevism,”
published in 1953, in which he analyzed “the precepts of maxims of political tactics and strategy
that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics” (George, 1969, 193), or
“Bolshevik character” (George, 1969, 201). At the time of its publication, Leites’ work was
considered to be more sophisticated in method, in fact, “some thought it introduced a new genre
of elite study that might fill some of the needs for a behavioral approach to studies of political
leadership” (George, 1969, 192). Leites’(1953) intention in studying the Bolsheviks by means of
the Operational Code was to “discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for
effective political conduct” in an attempt to “draw explicit and systematic formulations” from a
mass of Bolshevik literature, and to “set them down in a meaningful frame of reference.”
Some years after the publication of Leites’ work, it was re-examined by Alexander
George (1969), who claimed that what Leites claimed as “maxims of political strategy” were
actually the political beliefs of actors (Walker, 1990, 404). George (1969) believed that Leites’
term “operational code” was a bit misleading, as the term implied that an Operational Code was
an automatic recipe that faithfully used in decision making. However, he interpreted Leites’
Operational Code as more of “a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and
central questions of politics” as they relate to problem-solving in politics (George, 1969, 196).
By definition, George (1969) claimed that “a leader’s operational code should be identified
simply as a political belief system in which some elements (philosophical beliefs) guide the
leader’s diagnosis of the context for action and others (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the most
6

effective strategy and tactics in achieving goals.” In his work, George (1969) took Leites’ work
and re-examined it though his own perspective, making the Operational Code more replicable
and theory-based. George essentially re-organized the ideas produced in Leites’ work into two
types of beliefs that he believed were present in the Operational Code, philosophical and
instrumental beliefs.
Inspired by George, Ole Holsti (1970), in his attempt to further refine the methodology
for the Operational Code, created a typology of the six different types of belief systems political
actors could have. He created these typologies by determining how political actors might answer
George’s first philosophical questions, “What is the fundamental nature of the political
universe?” and “What are the fundamental sources of conflict?” (Holsti, 1970, 123). Based on
the answers to George’s questions, political actors would fall into Types A, B, C, or Type DEF
of Holsti’s typology. This typology gave political scientists and political psychologists a
guideline on how to identify the beliefs of a political actor according to the Operational Code,
making the method even more quantifiable in nature and practice. In later years, after the
production of multiple case studies that used the Operational Code, Holsti (1977) re-examined
these case studies to check the validity of his original typology.
In 1984, while studying the Operational Codes of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of
State, Walker and Falkowski (1984) further refined Holsti’s typology by creating specific “belief
statements” (411) that more specifically defined the political beliefs and motivations that were
apparent in each type of belief system present in the typology. This revised typology led Walker
and Falkowski (1984, 1990) to claim that the “aggregate pattern of crisis bargaining tactics by
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the governments of these decision-makers” tended to correspond to these congruent patterns of
motivations and beliefs.
Walker, Schafer and Young (1998) further improved the methodology of the Operational
Code in 1998 while studying the Operational Code of President Jimmy Carter. They decided to
study the Operational Code through means of the Verbs In Context System (known as VICS)
(Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998). The VICS method codes certain attributes according to the
“utterances” said in rhetorical speech, based on George’s (1969) philosophical and instrumental
beliefs (Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998, 182).
As explained above, the Operational Code has transformed as a result of the work of
different studies that sought to add on to the current methodology at the time. The mechanics for
the Operational Code methodology are explained below.
The Operational Code – The Method
The Operational Code contains two types of content, philosophical content and
instrumental content. The following questions define the Philosophical Content of an Operational
Code (George, 1969):
•

What is the “essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of
harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
(George, 1969, 201)

•

What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values
and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in
what respects the one and/or the other? (George, 1969, 203)

•

Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? (George, 1969, 203)
8

•

How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is
one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction? (George, 1969,
204)

•

What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development? (George,
1969, 204)

The Instrumental Beliefs of an Operational Code are defined in the following questions (George,
1969):
•

What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? (George,
1969, 205)

•

How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? (George, 1969, 211)

•

How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? (George, 1969,
212)

•

What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest? (George, 1969, 215)

•

What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest? (George,
1969, 216)

From here, as political actors are examined, their behaviors place them in one of Holsti’s (1970)
typologies, Types, A, B, C, and DEF. Types A, B, and C, are considered to be “optimistic,”
attributing to the claim that those actors who fall in these typologies belief that world conflict is
temporary. Types DEF, on the other hand, are grouped together and considered to be
“pessimistic” in belief, due to the fact that actors who fall in this typology are claimed to believe
that world conflict is ongoing and permanent. These typologies are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
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What is the fundamental
Nature of the Political
Universe?
Harmonious
Conflictual
(Conflict is
(Conflict is
Temporary)
permanent)
A
D

Human Nature
Attributes of
B
E
Nations
International
C
F
System
Holsti’s typologies (as cited by Walker, 1990, 408)

What are the
fundamental
sources of
conflict?

Figure 1

As mentioned before, Walker and Falkowski (1984) re-organized Holsti’s original typologies
into more specific belief statements, in order to better define what types of political leaders fall
into these typologies present in Figure 2.

Type A
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A
“conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war.
Opponents are often influenced by non-rational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to
conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and willingness to
shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible.
Instrumental: Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interest. Pursue broadly
international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and
acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for
negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.
Type B
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are
the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding
realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical
development is possible. Instrumental: One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a
comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource
may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited
risk.
10

Type C
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent
harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of
causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness.
One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and
control over historical development is low under anarchy. Instrumental: Establish optimal goals
vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting
means rather than ends. Act quickly when reconciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory
actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.
Type DEF
Philosophical: Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) or international
anarchy (F). Powerful disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary and responses to
conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run
depends on the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control
over historical development. Instrumental: Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use
military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.
Walker and Falkowski’s revised Holsti typologies (as cited by Walker, 1990, 411)
Figure 2

The Operational Code currently functions by means of the Verbs in Context System (or VICS),
which, as defined by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998, 1999), is “a set of techniques for
retrieving belief patterns from a leader’s public statements and drawing inferences about public
behavior that are compatible with these beliefs.” The VICS system records “utterances,” defined
as “each verb in the statement and the corresponding parts of speech associated with the verb—
the subject and object (if it is transitive verb), or the subject and predicate nominative or
adjective (if it is an intransitive verb)” (Walker, Schafer & Young 2003, 224). From there, the
VICS method attributes six attributes to the data produced from the utterances; “subject, verb
category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context” (Walker, Schafer &
Young 2003, 224).
Over time, the Operational Code has been vastly transformed over and over again in
order to study the Operational Codes of leaders from around the world. Through these

11

transformations, there have been developments in the theory and the lenses for analysis in this
methodology, resulting in the current methods that are used today. Through a new lens, I was
able to analyze how beliefs and the rhetorical articulation of those beliefs in presidential debates
have dominated the American political climate.

12

METHODOLOGY
In order to conduct a context analysis of the speech in presidential debates in order to
study candidates’ operational codes, I prepared my texts for analysis, processed the texts using a
program called Profiler Plus 5.8.4., and analyzed the results from the program. From there, I
cross-examined the different results from the belief values, and analyzed how political beliefs
determined the rhetoric surrounding those beliefs.
First and foremost, I collected transcripts of presidential debates ranging from 1976-2012
election cycles. Based on the historical background on American presidential debates, it is clear
that presidential debates did not become truly “regular” until 1976 (Schroeder, 2000). So, by
analyzing the fifty-five presidential debates that took place during that particular time period, I
was using a text sample that is rhetorically expected in regards to its regularly scheduled
appearances. These presidential debate transcripts were obtained at no cost from the website of
the Commission on Presidential Debates.
From there, I prepared my texts for analyzing using Profiler Plus 5.8.4. This program is
specifically designed to analyze Schafer’s methodology for the Operational Code using the
Verbs in Context System. Unlike other programs where a user would have to manually input
their own codes or key words, Profile Plus 5.8.4. has “pre-sets” of the codes that Schafer used to
study the Operational Code. To prepare each presidential debate transcript for processing, I had
to separate the difference lines of text spoken by each presidential candidate in order to make
sure that I would be analyzing the candidate’s own words, not those of his opponent’s or the
moderator’s.
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Once this was done, I processed the prepared debate transcripts through Profiler Plus, and
the program gave me a mass data set, outlining the different scores for each candidate for the
various beliefs and values of the Operational Code. This data sheet is available in Appendix I.
The values I chose to research were P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2.
•

P1 – Nature of the political universe.

•

P2 – Prospects for realization of political values.

•

P4 – Belief in historical control

•

I1 – Approach to goals (direction of strategy)

•

I2 – Pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)

From here, I ran the results using a means comparison analysis for these different values
in IBM SPSS in respect to my research questions. I first ran a means comparison analysis that
compared election years with belief scores of each party. I ran a second means comparison
analysis that compared the belief scores for each individual debate.
In order to better understand the rhetorical situations and historical data associated with
each debate, I referenced different sources of historical data and rhetorical theory. Materials on
rhetorical theory were obtained through The Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient
Greece and various scholarly articles. Historical data (i.e. domestic and international events that
surrounded each presidential debate) were obtained through election information as available in
the Change and Continuity in Elections series. So-called “winners” and “losers” of debates were
determined through historical data as described by the Change in Continuity in Elections Series
(Abramson, Aldrich, & Rhode), as well as through Gallup Polls and reactions from the
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FiveThirtyEight Blog written by Nate Silver. These sources all cited the historical winners and
losers of presidential debates.
By using the established methodology of the Operational Code while also putting my
own twist on analyzing its results, I was able to create a General Results Overview (available in
the next chapter), in which I was able to see the results from a full-scale vantage point. However,
in order to better create a more comprehensive analysis that would be able to characterize the
trends emerging from different election cycles, I decided to divide up the most significant trends
from my analysis into four different case studies, available in the chapters that follow.

15

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
In considering how beliefs have dominated election cycles through the history of
presidential elections, I had originally chosen to answer the following research questions below.
For a clearer view of the results, please refer to Appendices D-I.
What Beliefs Are Apparent And Consistent Over Time?
Walker (2000) suggests that tracking certain characteristics over time create predictions
about what future actions a leader might take, as well as any possible shifts in behavior that
might occur.
In examining the evolution of beliefs from 1976-2012, it was found that belief values
rose and fell together for almost every election, with only some anomalies.
As I examined the profiles of presidential candidates that have debated in two or more
election cycles, I discovered that candidates’ beliefs change from when they first debate to
become president to when they are debating to keep themselves in office. Not a single incumbent
candidate had consistent belief scores when comparing one round of debates to the next.
Are Certain Beliefs Exclusive To Party Lines?
The Democratic and Republican parties have dominated the American political system
for hundreds of years, and so have their candidates. With the exception of John Anderson and
Ross Perot, candidates have either debated as a Democrat or a Republican.
In examining whether Democratic and Republican candidates have similar operational
code scores in-party, it was found that scores are not consistent on the basis of party. In other
words, scores rose and fell together in terms of party lines.
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In examining Democrat belief systems against Republican belief systems, it was found
that they had very similar beliefs from election to election. In this way, it was clear that each
party molded their beliefs and their candidate to the historical factors of the election.
Do “Winners” And “Losers” Of Debates Have Similar Beliefs?
For presidential debates, one of the most pertinent goals of the candidate is winning the
debate. Whoever wins the debate provides extra momentum for their presidential campaign in
the short run, and that surge of momentum in the campaign cycle could mean extra percentage
points in the polls.
In finding out of there were certain beliefs that all debate and elections winners or losers
share, it was evident that presidential candidates were all over the map—in other words, there
was no specific evidence from the Operational Code scores that could necessarily determine a
winner or loser of a debate, or the election.
It can be inferred that articulated beliefs are a product of rhetorical statements, in some
form or another. Therefore, when a candidate speaks about his beliefs, he is presenting his
thoughts in a rhetorical manner. When the beliefs of a candidate change, the way in which he
speaks about them are bound to change as well. In other words, beliefs and the words used to
articulate them act together as a unit. In examining the case studies that follow, the relationship
between Operational code beliefs and debate rhetoric will be examined on a closer level. I will
examine the answers to the following questions:
Over time: What was the rhetorical and historical situation for each election, and
how do these factors account for the ways that belief scores rise and fall the way
they do?
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By Party: How or in what ways were parties and candidates changing their
beliefs to match the exigency of what the election called for?
Winners/Losers: Which candidate was able to master the art of debating
rhetorically, and why did it work (or not work) so well?
One election cycle at a time, presidential candidates have highly influenced the belief
systems and the discourse of the American political climate. Candidates shape their discourse
according to the beliefs that they hold to be true. As their beliefs change, the way in which they
articulate those beliefs will change as well. The following case studies will use the Operational
Code to look at belief systems with a new rhetorical perspective. In doing so, the results shed
light on how and when our political environment began to mirror the current state of politics in
the United States.
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RHETORICAL THEORY OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Considering that the articulation of beliefs change the rhetoric of the presidential debates,
there are certain rhetorical factors that affect the way in which beliefs are articulated. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the rhetorical concepts that will be
used to explain this phenomenon in the case studies that follow, and to also provide a basis for
the results presented in the General Results Overview.
The Rhetorical Situation as Defined by Grant-Davie

Rhetor
According to rhetorician Keith-Grant Davie (1997), a rhetor is defined as “those people,
real or imagined, responsible for the discourse and its authorial voice.” For the intents and
purpose of this discussion, a rhetor is primarily the presidential candidate themselves, but the
candidate is not the only rhetor in play during presidential debates.
Grant-Davie (1997) notes that rhetors “play several roles at once.” Candidates as rhetors
are no different—they do not speak just as themselves, but as their political parties, their
speechwriters, or even their major campaign contributors. In addition, when building their own
ethos, or credibility, the rhetor might play several roles at once, that when pulled together, form
the composite rhetor of the candidate. For example, when Barack Obama ran for president in
2004, he played several roles at once as a rhetor. He was the moderate and the liberal, the young
but experienced Senator from Illinois, the tenacious but patient leader, the man that grew up
from nothing and graduated from Harvard, the father of his children, and the aspiring leader of
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his political party—all of whom he was and would be if elected to be President of the United
States.
As rhetors, presidential candidates have to take what they’ve prepared for weeks or
months and let it unfold into the proper setting of the debates. According to Consigny (1997),
rhetors use both integrity and receptivity in their speech. Debate-wise, integrity, “a measure of
consistency they take from situation to situation” can be thought of as the long-rehearsed talking
points and stump speeches that candidates give during debates, things that still work in the
debates, but have also worked during other rhetorical situations, such as campaign rallies.
However, in the ever-changing rhetorical nature of debates, a candidate cannot survive a debate
on integrity alone. He also must have receptivity, “the ability to adapt to new situations and not
rigidly play the same role in everyone one” (Grant-Davie, 1997). This concepts highlights the
spontaneous nature of debates, while illustrating that no matter how much a candidate has
prepared, he must be prepared to be flexible and change with the rhetorical situation as it ebbs
and flows during the debate.

Audience
Grant-Davie defines audience as “those people, real or imagined, with whom the rhetors
negotiate through discourse to achieve the rhetorical objectives” (1997). In terms for audiences
for presidential debates, the rhetors address several audiences: the American electorate and its
many constituents of all different races, economic classes, and standing, the candidate’s
opponent and his campaign, the base and outsiders of his political party, his dissenters, and the
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independents. There are, of course, an infinite amount of audiences that the candidates must
face—an enormous task for one person to attempt to master.
As much as a presidential candidate will try to resonate with his diverse audiences as
possible, it is something that he might not be able to ever master completely. However, the
degree to which a candidate can effectively resonate with his audiences will reflect how close (or
how far away) he is to winning the presidency. If the candidate’s rhetoric does not sit well with
his audiences, he risks throwing away his chances for the presidency.

Constraints
Constraints are defined by Grant-Davie (1997) as “factors in the situation’s context that
may affect the achievement of the rhetorical objectives.” The candidate as the rhetor must
maneuver around and through constraints in order to be successful in the debate.
A candidate’s own integrity and receptivity act as contradictory constraints, as the
president must work within the constraints of what he has prepared, but must remain calm and
respond when the debate throws him a fork in the road. In this high-pressure situation, the
president must maneuver existing constraints to make sure that something he spontaneously says
does not cost him a vital audience, or worse, the election.
The setting of a presidential debate itself has many constraints. For one, the format of the
debate, whether it be formal or town-hall style, constrains how the moderator controls the debate
and who asks the questions in the debate. The rules regarding format and timing, tirelessly
negotiated between both campaigns and the Commission on Presidential Debates, also greatly
constrains the candidates, as they are limited by limits on timing, rebuttals, closing statements,
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and the subjects that each debate contains (i.e. domestic or policy issues, or more specifically,
issues such as taxes or the War in Iraq). In addition to the subjects presented to each debate, the
questions that are asked regarding each subject provide a constraint to the candidates, as they not
only dictate the debate itself, but also test the candidates’ ability to use their receptivity to match
what they’ve practiced to answer the question at hand. To make it harder, historically, debate
moderators have chosen to keep the debate questions to themselves prior to the start of the
debate. As once stated by moderator Jim Lehrer during the first presidential debate of 2000, “The
questions and the subjects were chosen by me alone. I have told no one from the two campaigns,
or the Commission, or anyone else involved what they are” (CPD, 2000). Finally, the medium of
the debates, usually broadcast through television and radio, provide constraints for the
candidates, as they must navigate certain debate tactics pertinent to this medium. Constraints are
also created by debate speech and rhetoric as the debate plays out. Candidates are often
constrained by what their opponents level against them, and are forced to respond against their
opponent’s allegations instead of talking about the issue at hand.
However, constraints should not just be considered as negative factors that hinder
candidates during debates. There are also constraints that the rhetor can harness to his advantage
(Grant-Davie, 1997). For example, the constraint of time could be considered to be a hindrance if
the allotted time does not allow enough time for the candidate to express his ideals. However, if
the candidate has already expressed his ideals and has time to spare, he can use this extra time in
the spotlight to highlight his stance on another issue, a popular move used by presidential
candidates to clear up “falsehoods” portrayed by their opponent about themselves.
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Exigence
Exigence is defined as “the matter and motivation of the discourse” by Grant-Davie
(1997). Exigence is not just about what the candidate says, but why they are saying it. Exigencies
of the candidates will include what they are speaking about, why that speech is needed, and what
that speech is trying to accomplish (Grant-Davie, 1997).
A rhetor, or in this case, a presidential candidate, must respond to the exigence of the
presidential debate in a way that resonates tightly with his audiences within the given constraints.
It is imperative that he does this, because if his exigency does not respond to the situation that he
faces, he risks losing his audience or his own credibility.
Another aspect about responding to the exigency of a presidential debate is the debate’s
timing in the election. In many debates, such as in the 1992 debate Bill Clinton, George H. W.
Bush and Ross Perot, or in the 2008 debates between Barack Obama and John McCain, the
economy took a sudden downturn during the debate period. Both Clinton and Obama succeeded
greatly in utilizing the rhetorical concept of kairos, Greek for timing, by capitalizing on the
situation of the bad economy, and using rhetoric to face this problem head-on and use that
situation to their advantage.
Kairos as a Driving Force
Kairos, in the Greek language, means the timing of rhetoric. However, kairos means
much more than just “timing” itself. According to Debra Hawhee (2004), “Kairos marks force.
Kairos is thus rhetoric’s timing….quality, [and] direction.” Continuing with the example above,
it wasn’t just Clinton or Obama’s timing that helped them to successfully capitalize on the bad
economy, it was the hard-hitting force and relevant quality of their rhetoric that made them
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successful, as they were able to resonate with their audience and make them realize how
important it was to elect them as president because of the current economic situation.
Hawhee (2004) also talks about how kairos is a word used in the ancient culture that
relates to the art of weaving. She mentions how kairos, in variation, is used to describe “where
threads attach to the loom; the act of fastening these threads…that which is tightly woven.” In
regards to rhetoric, this related example of the word kairos helps to describe not just the force of
kairos, but the fact that a successful usage of kairos requires an intense level of relevancy. In
other words, “woven,” in a weaver’s case, translates to “relevant to the times” in a rhetor’s case.
The situation in which the timing of kairos takes place must be relevant to the audience.
Continuing with the example above, the reason why capitalizing on the bad economy worked so
well for Clinton and Obama was because the bad economy affected every person in the
American electorate, and they were looking for a solution to make the situation better. While
talking about the environment might resonate with only those that care about the environment,
the economy is a relevant and close-to-home topic for every voter.
In the scholarship of rhetoric, there are two basic models for kairos, the accommodation
and creation models of kairos. The accommodation model, spearheaded by rhetorician James
Kinneavy (2004), dictates that “kairos directs the rhetor to consider to adapt to the tones and
moods of the situation at hand…the character of the audience to which the speaker must suit his
language and argument.”
Baumlin formulates a creation model of kairos, one where the “rhetor-in-charge creates
his or her own operates…who operates mainly with the awareness of kairos responds
simultaneously to the fleeting situation at hand…both a hunter and maker of unique
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opportunities…ready to address improvisationally and confer meaning on new and emerging
situations” (Hawhee, 2004). Baumlin’s creation model of kairos relates heavily to Cosigny’s
concept receptivity, both capturing the importance of the rhetor’s ability to speak toward new
situations. The creation model of kairos and receptivity can help describe the way in which all
debates differ from one another, as well as the fact that no matter how much a candidate prepares
for a debate, he cannot predict the outcome or his performance during the debate until that
moment arrives.
Conclusion
Using the constituents of the rhetorical situation—rhetor, audience, constraints, and
exigence—will give a different perspective when interpreting Operational Code belief changes.
Kairos is the driving force for most of the results presented in the results overview. Based on the
findings presented in the results overview, it seems that candidates and parties tailor their
rhetoric based on kairos—in other words, their beliefs (and the rhetoric articulating those belief)
change with the exigence and kairos of every election in order to appeal with the audience, the
American electorate.
This explains why mean scores by party are not consistent from election to election, yet
rise and fall together with every election, and why winners and losers were not consistent from
debate to debate. Rhetorically and methodologically, the beliefs of candidates and parties are
only are articulated based on what they think the American people will vote for.
With every election, there are different beliefs of the audience that the candidates must
appeal to, and ideally, the candidate who was able to match his beliefs with the beliefs of the
American electorate won the election.
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It is important to remember the relationships between rhetoric, audience, constraints,
exigence and kairos, as they will illustrate why beliefs changed in the way that they did, and to
what extent throughout the years. As candidates are analyzed in the upcoming case studies, they
will be evaluated on whether they were able to connect with their audience in a way that wins
them the presidency. This also includes how well each candidate effectively capitalized on their
exigency through the use of kairos, using the timing of their campaign and the debates to their
advantage.
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CASE STUDY: RONALD REAGAN, 1980-1984
INTRODUCTION
Out of any other candidate studied in this thesis, Ronald Reagan is the one that was able
to nearly unite the entire nation with his rhetoric, with victories in 45 states in 1980, and victories
49 out of 50 states during his re-election in 1984. His role as “The Great Communicator” in the
face of this overwhelming victory is quite significant in terms of the Operational Code.
Interestingly enough, Reagan was a leader who won the presidency and his re-election by
landslides during a time period in which the lowest Operational Code mean scores were
exhibited, by both him and his Democratic opponents Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale. While
Carter’s scores are completely different from Reagan’s it seems that Mondale’s scores were
somewhat closer to Reagan’s, possibly signifying that Mondale attempted to be closer
rhetorically to Reagan.
This chapter will focus on Ronald Regan in terms of his Operational Code scores as
shaped in presidential debates between 1980-1984. This chapter will also focus on Mondale’s
attempts to imitate Reagan’s Operational Code scores, as well as significance of this finding.
Reagan’s Role As A Rhetor In The 1980-1984 Elections

The Election of 1980
As the opposition against the Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter who had an ill-fated
presidency, Ronald Reagan gained ethos, or credibility, as a rhetor by opposing Carter on many
issues, but more importantly, being the kairotic answer to many of America’s problems.
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For example, one of the problems with President Carter’s stance on inflation was that,
according to Abramson et al. (1982), he placed it “at the top of his economic priorities” at a time
when inflation was at record highs. Therefore, as Abramson et al. (1982) put it, “Carter, as
president, was held responsible by many for high inflation and interest rates…” Reagan, coming
in with his plans of supply-side economics, was, in a sense, the kairotic anecdote that would cure
Carter’s Democratic fiscal policies that had led to high inflation and interest rates.
In regards to the two party platforms at their respective conventions, it seems that Reagan
and the Republicans were out to change foreign policy direction from that of the Democrats as
well. Since it was perceived that President Carter terribly handled the Iran Hostage Crisis,
Reagan’s foreign policies again swept in as relief for Carter’s perceived ineffectiveness.
Carter supposedly “got mean” during the election, but what else was he supposed to do
when his own popularity was dropping due to the fact that his opponent was the supposed
kairotic anecdote to all that he had done wrong during his presidency?
The results of the 1980 election made it pretty clear that Reagan had entranced America
as a rhetor with his rhetoric and beliefs. Reagan won 50.8% of the popular vote and forty-four of
the states, while Carter had won only 41.0% of the vote and only six states plus D.C., while
Anderson won 6.6% of the popular vote and zero states. These results showed America’s need to
get rid of Carter and replace him with someone like Reagan, a person who they felt had what it
took to lead them through the 1980’s with confidence and vigor that had been absent from the
presidency for so long.
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The Election of 1984
As a president who had to defend his own record, Reagan’s role as a rhetor had changed
quite a bit from the 1980 election. No longer was he the one that was rallying against an
opponent, but he was trying to garner his same supporters with a presidential record.
During his first term as president, Reagan’s implementation of supply-side economics
resulted in a brief recession in 1982, however, the economy miraculously recovered between
1983-1984. Unemployment had also actually gone down during Reagan’s term to 8.2% in 1983.
In addition, the inflation rate at the time of Reagan’s re-election was below 5%, which was
significantly less compared to the rate of inflation of when Carter had run for re-election, which
was 13.5% at the time. Lastly, Reagan’s approval rating at the time that he left office stood at a
whopping 61% (Abramson et al., 1986). It seems like what Reagan had promised he had mostly
delivered, which was good, because the American people were desperate for results when they
had elected him back in 1980, and were satisfied enough to elect him again in 1984.
For the election of 1984, the Democratic Party that was automatically “on the defensive”
throughout the election, trying to justify “why a Democrat should be elected instead of Reagan”
(Abramson et al., 1982). Considering that Reagan’s ethos as a rhetor, his relevant exigence
during the election, and his strong kairotic ties with the issues that he articulated during his
campaign, this was a poor choice of rhetoric exigence for the Democrats, as if they were willing
putting themselves in front of a speeding train.
Reagan’s scores for value P1 decrease to the lowest P1 score out of all other presidents.
In 1980, he held a P1 score of .2250, which dropped to .0650 in 1984. This means that Reagan
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believed that the nature of the political universe was hostile more so than any other presidential
candidate.
Reagan’s P2 scores follow this same pattern. Reagan’s P2 score in 1980 was .0500,
which dropped to -.0200 in 1984, against, making his score the lowest score out of all of the
other presidential candidates. This demonstrates that Reagan was the most pessimistic out of the
other presidents regarding the realization of his political values.
Reagan’s score for P4 actually increases between 1980-1984, changing from .2650 to
.3300. Reagan’s I1 score decreased during this time period, while his I2 score decreased. His I1
score decreased from .3700 in 1980 to .3350 in 1984, while his I2 score increased from .1050 in
1980 to .1250 in 1984. This means that from the time period between running for office and his
re-election, Reagan believed in more conflict-oriented tactics but more cooperative strategies.
Since Reagan’s belief had a significant standing in regards to the amount of votes he
received in the 1980 election, this sent out a clear message to his Democratic opponents.
Mondale, attempting to capture the kairos that Reagan had during the 1980 elections, had
articulated his beliefs in a similar manner—not in a manner that strayed against the views of the
Democratic Party, but in a way which communicated that, on a very fundamental and basic
world, was looking at the same world and election period as Reagan.
How Reagan’s Opponents Measure Up; Mondale’s Mistake
When comparing Reagan to his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale, it seems as if the
Democrats were attempting to match their rhetoric to the tone of the 1984 campaign, bending
their rhetoric to act more like Reagan’s resulting in low scores across most of the values.
Mondale’s scores sometimes come close to Reagan’s, but considering that Reagan
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overwhelmingly won both the popular and electoral votes, it’s clear that his ideas still separated
him from Reagan, even though his belief scores were in the vicinity of Reagan’s.
Carter and Mondale react quite differently to Reagan in regards to their mean scores for
the value P1. Carter’s P1 score of .5000 dropped to Mondale’s score of .1400 in 1984. Reagan’s
P1 score plunged as well, as he scored .2250 in 1980, and .0650 in 1984. It seems that kairos and
historical factors seem responsible for the fact that both parties plunged in scores from 19801984, but there’s more to the story. In 1980, Carter was very high up in comparison to Reagan on
this value, and essentially made no effort to be like Reagan on this score. Noting Carter’s losses,
Mondale tried to make his rhetoric a little more like Reagan’s in order to win the election. This
attempt, however, was unsuccessful, because he had rhetorically articulated that he believed that
the nature of the political universe was more hostile than Reagan had articulated it to be. It seems
like Mondale’s rhetoric on this value changed because of kairos, but also because he wanted to
get on a level that was close to Reagan’s beliefs, even though their campaign ideas were
completely different.
The Democrats had a similar reaction in mean scores with value P2, as Mondale’s scores
dropped to be in the same ballpark as Reagan’s scores. The Democrats’ scores for P2 dropped
dramatically from 1980-1984, while Reagan’s changes between scores during this time period
are not that significant. Carter’s mean score for P2 in 1980 was .3600, while Mondale’s score in
1984 was .0350. Reagan’s score in 1980 was .0500, and in 1980, it had dropped to -.0200. This
essentially means that the Democrats believed that Carter’s mean score had been too high for this
value in 1980, considering his loss. So, with Mondale, they sought to match his beliefs/rhetoric
more towards Reagan. They did this to a significant degree with a mean score difference of
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.3250, but they did not go far enough, as Mondale’s score still sits above Reagan’s mean score
for this value in 1984.
Going along with their instincts to articulate the situation of the 1984 election, their
scores for I1 and I2 show that tried to hard in this regard. The Democrats’ score for I1 fell
significantly between 1980-1984, but Reagan’s scores barely decreased during that time. Both
Carter’s and Reagan’s I1 score was .3700 in 1980, but in 1984, Mondale’s score dropped down
the Democrats down to .1650, while Reagan’s had barely decreased at .3350. Similar findings
were discovered with value I2, where the score decreased for the Democrats from .1200 to .0350,
but increased for Reagan, from .1050 to .1250. In both of these cases, Mondale, possibly trying
to rhetorically match Reagan, went too far with his efforts in this regard, rhetorically articulating
that he believed in more conflicted-oriented strategies than Reagan did, which did not resonate
well with the American people.
With the P4 value, the Democrats followed the same trend as Reagan, but still were not
close enough to make an impact. The scores for P4 actually increased during this period. In
1980, Carter’s mean score for P4 showed that he had the lowest belief in his ability to control
historical development out of every election cycle, .1700, in 1984, Mondale’s score was .2580.
Reagan’s score rose as well, although with a much smaller influx than the Democrats’, from
.2650 in 1980 to .3300 in 1984. Mondale, again, tried to match his rhetoric in regards to Reagan,
but still came up short with a lower score than Reagan had in 1984.
When comparing Reagan’s mean scores to those of the Democrats, it is clear that the
Democrats realized that they needed to change their outlook when they reflected upon Jimmy
Carter’s performance in the 1980 election. Walter Mondale’s Operational Code scores in the
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1984 election came relatively close to Reagan’s at times, but he still lost the election in an asskicking defeat against Reagan.
Conclusion
Reagan’s rhetoric was a strong force attributing to his landslide victories in the 1980 and
1984 elections. In his first election, Reagan gained ethos as a rhetor by acting as the kairotic
answer to America’s problems. He won 50.8% of the popular vote and 44 states in his first
election, and an overwhelming victory for his kairotic rhetoric. In his second election, Reagan’s
exigence changed as a result of his incumbency, but his kairotic connection with the American
people was still strong.
In the 1984 election, Reagan exhibited some of the lowest Operational Code scores out of
all of the presidential candidates that were studied. Out of the candidates that were studied,
Reagan believed that the nature of the political universe was the most hostile, and he was the
most pessimistic about the realization of his political values. In regards to his other Operational
Code beliefs, Reagan believed in more conflict-oriented tactics but more cooperative strategies.
As shown by the plunge in the Democrats’ Operational Code scores from 1980-1984, it is
clear that the Democrats were not happy at all with Carter’s performance in the 1980 election.
Therefore, for the 1984 election, the Democrats chose a candidate that saw the world through a
Reagan-like pair of eyes on the fundamental level. It turns out that Reagan’s beliefs carried such
a strong segment of the population that the Democrats found the need to imitate him with Walter
Mondale. Although this attempt by Reagan’s opponents was unsuccessful, it further exemplifies
how Reagan was able to divulge beliefs and rhetoric that were so relevant to the American
electorate at that time.
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CASE STUDY: THE INCUMBENTS
INTRODUCTION
In general, incumbents tend gain a lot of benefits from their incumbency. In fact, it’s a
candidate’s incumbency that makes them more likely to win their election. However, a
candidate’s incumbency does not automatically determine a win or a loss for their re-election. A
candidate must rely on what he has learned in office to make a plea to the electorate for why he
deserves a second term. Incumbency also means a shift in rhetorical exigencies for the rhetor (the
candidate). No longer is the candidate part of the opposition, trying to fight against someone else
in office. He now has to use what he’s experienced and accomplished in office to defend the
reason why he deserves another four years in office.
Below is Figure 3, which contains the names and election years of incumbent candidates,
whether they won or lost their re-election, and whether their mean scores for their values
increased or decrease in value from their first election to the second. There were a few basic
trends that will be described and asserted throughout this chapter.
Candidate
Carter
‘76/’80
Reagan
‘80/’84
H.W. Bush
‘88/’92
Clinton
‘92/’96
W. Bush
‘00/’04
Obama
‘08/’12

Win/Lose
Incumbency

P1

P2

P4

I1

I2

Lose

Increase

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Win

Decrease

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Lose

Increase

Increase

Decrease

Decrease

Decrease

Win

Decrease

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Win

Decrease

Decrease

Stagnant

Decrease

Decrease

Win

Increase

Increase

Increase

Decrease

Decrease

Figure 3
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P1, P2, and P4 – Candidates Who Won their Re-Election, and Why
Values P1, P2, and P4 can comfortable assert who won their re-elections and why others
did not, depending on whether the candidates increased or decreased on these values. Reagan,
Clinton, and W. Bush all won their re-election campaigns. Obama won his incumbent election as
well, although his scores demonstrate an anomaly, which will be explained later in this chapter.
This particular trend starts with a quick analysis of value P1, citing a candidate’s belief
regarding the nature of the political universe. This belief reveals whether the candidate believes
that the nature of the political universe is hostile or friendly. With Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush,
they all show a decrease in the P1 value when comparing their mean scores for their first and reelection campaigns. This means that all three candidates had thought that the nature of the
political universe was more hostile than they did when they first stepped into office. Reagan had
a P1 score .2250 in 1980, but the score dropped to .0650 in 1984. Clinton had a decrease in this
score from 1991—1996, scoring .4733 to .4450, respectively. W. Bush had a decrease in his
mean scores, scoring .4233 in 2000 to .2033 in 2004. Throughout their presidencies, these
candidates’ views regarding this belief became increasingly hardened and pessimistic.
These candidates, along with their decreased scores for P1, also show a decrease in value
for P2. This means that at the same time that candidates were learning about a more hostile view
of the universe, their pessimism regarding the realization of their political values increased. So,
in other words, they might have attributed the non-accomplishment of their political goals to the
external nature of the political universe. Reagan had a decrease in this value, scoring .0500 in
1980 and .0350 in 1984. Clinton also had a decrease in his value from 1992-1996, scoring .2500
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and .2450, respectively. Lastly, W. Bush had a decrease in this score, scoring .2133 in 2000 and
.0776 in 2004.
The value of P4 actually posits an opposite or almost stagnant reaction in relation to
increases and decreases for values P1 and P2. This points to a rise in belief of historical control
for Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush. In relation to the other values, this might come from an
assumption that while the candidate might not have all of their political goals accomplished from
a more hostile world, both external values, they still feel that their internal political efficacy is
still high. Reagan’s scores illustrate this opposite increase, rising from .2650 in 1980 to .3300 in
1984. Clinton’s scores also rise from 1992-1996 from .3133 to .3300. W. Bush’s scores are
stagnant, staying motionless at .3667.
This trend indicates winning values for the successful incumbents that carry this trend.
The losing value of those that don’t follow this trend can be exemplified by H. W. Bush’s
unsuccessful re-election campaign in 1992.
Bush’s Unsuccessful Incumbent Election
Bush did not win his re-election against Clinton in 1992. In accordance with the model
mentioned above, this was because George H. W. Bush did not think that the nature of the
political universe was more hostile after his first term in office, and that the he was increasingly
optimistic about the realization of his political goals.
For P1, Bush scored .3100 in 1988, and scored .3800 in 1992, meaning that Bush thought
that the world was more friendly in 1992 than he did in 1988, which is different from the other
incumbents that had won before and after him. In 1988, Bush’s debate rhetoric surrounded the
idea of turning America into a “kinder and gentler nation” (cite?).
36

BUSH: Because I mean it when I say I want a kinder and gentler nation. This election is
about big things. And perhaps the biggest is world peace. And I ask you to consider the
experience I have had in working with a President who has revolutionized the situation
around the world. America stands tall again, and as a result, we are credible. (CPD, 1988)
It’s as if, in 1992, he really believed that he had created that “kinder and gentler” nation (CPD,
1988), because in his eyes, rhetorically defending his presidential record, he believed that the
nature of the political universe was friendlier.
BUSH: I just thought of another…big difference here between me. I don't believe Mr.
Perot feels this way, but I know Governor Clinton did because I want to accurately quote
him. He thinks, I think he said, that the country is coming apart at the seams. Now, I
know that the only way he can win is to make everybody believe the economy's worse
than it is. But this country is not coming apart at the seams, for heaven's sakes. We're the
United States of America. In spite of the economic problems, we're the most respected
economy around the world. Many would trade for it. We've been caught up in a global
slowdown. We can do much, much better, but we ought not try to convince the American
people that America is a country that's coming apart at the seams. I would hate to be
running for president and think that the only way I could win would be to convince
everybody how horrible things are. Yes, there are big problems, and yes, people are
hurting. But I believe that this Agenda for American renewal I have is the answer to do it,
and I believe we can get it done now, whereas we didn't in the past, because you're going
to have a whole brand new bunch of people in the Congress that are going to have to
listen to the same American people I'm listening to. (CPD, 1988)
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In a rhetorical situation where other incumbents have addressed a more hostile political universe,
Bush denies it in the excerpt above. Slyly defending his own economic record as president, he
tries to discredit his opponents by claiming that the economy is not as bad as their rhetoric
portrays it to be. While he does recognize that “yes, there are big problems, and yes people are
hurting,” the way that he masks it in saying that the economic situation is not as bad as portrayed
to be was not cutting it for the American people. Since they were suffering through a bad
economy at the time, their ears tended to perk more towards Clinton, who embraced the portrait
of a bad economy in his opposing rhetoric against President Bush.
For value P2, he scored .1050 in 1988 and .1833 in 1992. This reveals that Bush was
more optimistic about the realization of his political values in 1992 than when he first stepped
into the Oval Office in 1988. This makes sense in relation to his P1 score, that he thought that a
somewhat friendly nature of the political universe was why he was more optimistic about the
realization of his political values. It is, however, different from that of other winning incumbents.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I think one thing that distinguishes is experience. I think
we've dramatically changed the world. I'll talk about that a little bit later, but the changes
are mind-boggling for world peace. Kids go to bed at night without the same fear of
nuclear war. And change for change sake isn't enough. We saw that message in the late
70s when heard a lot about change, and what happened, that misery index went right
through the roof. But my economic program is the kind of change we want. And the way
we're going to get it done is we're going to have a brand new Congress. A lot of them are
thrown out because of all the scandals. I'll sit down with them, Democrats and
Republicans alike, and work for my agenda for American renewal, which represents real
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change. But I'd say, if you had to separate out, I think it's experience at this level. (CPD,
1992)
Since Bush believed during his re-election campaign that the political universe was friendlier
than it was when he first walked into office, it makes sense that he believed that a friendlier
world could result in the realization of his political values. Departing from the rhetoric of
incumbents past and future, Bush’s confidence that he’s going to get “a brand new Congress,”
due to external factors that “a lot of them are thrown out because of scandals,” which, he seems
to think, works in his favor, seems to account a little bit for Bush’s increased optimism for the
realization of his political values.
For P4, Bush scored .4200 in 1988, and .3667 in 1992. Therefore, Bush believed that he
had less control over historical development at re-election than he did on his first day of office.
His P4 degree does decrease in opposite accordance with his P1 and P2 scores. This might have
been because he had an opposite way of thinking than the other winning incumbent candidates,
as he might have thought because there was a somewhat friendly political universe in which he
could be optimistic that his political values would be realized, in which he didn’t have to rely on
internal political efficacy.
Barack Obama – The Incumbent Anomaly
Unlike other incumbents, Obama did not have decreases for the values of P1 and P2, and
did not have an opposite reaction in his value for P4. These trends for Obama’s scores are
opposite in numbers and similar in pattern to that of his fellow successful incumbents, Reagan,
Clinton, and W. Bush. Obama had an increase for the value of P1, scoring .2800 in 2008, and
scoring .3467 in 2012. Obama had an increase for the value of P2 as well, with a mean score of
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.1133 in 2008, and a score of .1533 in 2012. Finally, for the value of P4, Obama had an increase
in score, from .3033 in 2008 to .3200 in 2012. So, if Obama was had a successful incumbent reelection just like Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush, why do his score increases for P1, P2, and P4
act as anomalies?
It starts off with the assumption that Obama had a similar rhetorical strategy as his other
successful incumbent candidates during his first election. Like Reagan had rallied against Carter,
like Clinton had rallied against H. W. Bush, and like W. Bush had rallied against Clinton, Obama
had rallied against the lame-duck president, George W. Bush. Much of his campaign and debate
surrounded the argument that, by electing his Republican opponent John McCain, that voters
would be voting for a president that acted like George W. Bush 2.0. So, in regards to his “fight
against” kind of rhetoric, Obama had begun at the same starting point as the other successful
incumbent candidates. Therefore, Obama’s anomalies do not begin with questioning his
Operational Code scores in 2008, it begins with asking why they increased instead of decreased
in 2012 when he ran for re-election.
Even though all of the other successful incumbent presidents had a complicated exigence
as presidents defending their records in office, Obama’s was slightly more complicated during
his election in 2012. Like the other incumbents, Obama had to defend his presidential record, and
ferociously establish and articulate why a Republican should not be elected over him as president
at that time. Reagan did not have to do this to the degree of severity that Obama had to, as Walter
Mondale was an easy opponent to fend off and shut down. Clinton was in the same boat. In terms
of his presidential record, he portrayed it as a long list of achievements and accomplishments that
deserved to be added to, and didn’t have to do too much damage to fend of Bob Dole in the
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debates. Out of the other successful incumbents, Bush had to forcefully fend off Kerry in the
wake of 9/11 and anti-war sentiments that Kerry was trying to capitalize on. So, if Obama had a
similar exigence, why was it that Obama’s scores increased while Bush’s decreased?
Obama had to portray a better America in his beliefs. He, like Reagan, continually asked
voters, in the debates and on the campaign trail, if they were better off than they were four years
ago. In order to stay true to that sentiment, he had to belief in a better world himself. The
increases in Obama’s scores might have been the product about what Obama had already
portrayed the world to be in 2008, and the increase in scores illustrates his attempt to bridge that
gap with his rhetoric in 2012. Since he had pretty negative views regarding the Bush presidency
in 2008, he had to make the point that he had actually made a difference in improving this
negativity through his four years in office.
His increase in the value for P1 illustrated that he believed that the nature of the political
universe was more friendly as a result of the actions that he had taken as president in office. In
2012, he stated:
OBAMA: You know, four years ago we went through the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression. Millions of jobs were lost, the auto industry was on the brink of
collapse. The financial system had frozen up. And because of the resilience and the
determination of the American people, we've begun to fight our way back. Over the last
30 months, we've seen 5 million jobs in the private sector created. The auto industry has
come roaring back. And housing has begun to rise. But we all know that we've still got a
lot of work to do. And so the question here tonight is not where we've been, but where
we're going… Now, it ultimately is going to be up to the voters -- to you -- which path
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we should take. Are we going to double on top-down economic policies that helped to get
us into this mess or do we embrace a new economic patriotism that says America does
best when the middle class does best? And I'm looking forward to having that debate.
(CPD, 2012)
In this statement, Obama strikes a very stark and deep contrast between the historic situation
between the reasons why he was elected in 2008, and why he should be elected today in 2012.
His values for P2 indicate the same trend, that he was more optimistic about the realization of his
political values, due to what he felt that he had accomplished during his first time in office.
Obama’s score for P4 also increases, which is opposite to the trend that is apparent with
the other successful incumbents. While other incumbents believed that their political efficacy
had increased due to their more hostile views about the nature of the political universe and their
increased pessimism regarding the realization of their political values, Obama held that the
opposite was true. By the time of re-election, Obama had believed that the nature of the political
universe had become friendlier, was more optimistic about the realization of his political values,
and that he had increased control over historical development. Obama makes it very clear that
he, as president, has accomplished certain achievements for the American people, and constantly
attributes these achievements to himself. His plans for the future are also very centered on
himself as well, as demonstrated by the statement from one of the 2012 debates below:
OBAMA: When I walked into the Oval Office, I had more than a trillion-dollar deficit
greeting me. And we know where it came from: two wars that were paid for on a credit
card; two tax cuts that were not paid for; and a whole bunch of programs that were not
paid for; and then a massive economic crisis. And despite that, what we've said is, yes,
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we had to take some initial emergency measures to make sure we didn't slip into a Great
Depression, but what we've also said is, let's make sure that we are cutting out those
things that are not helping us grow…we went after medical fraud in Medicare and
Medicaid very aggressively, more aggressively than ever before, and have saved tens of
billions of dollars, $50 billion of waste taken out of the system. And I worked with
Democrats and Republicans to cut a trillion dollars out of our discretionary domestic
budget. That's the largest cut in the discretionary domestic budget since Dwight
Eisenhower. Now, we all know that we've got to do more. And so I've put forward a
specific $4 trillion deficit reduction plan. It's on a website. You can look at all the
numbers, what cuts we make and what revenue we raise. And the way we do it is $2.50
for every cut, we ask for $1 of additional revenue, paid for, as I indicated earlier, by
asking those of us who have done very well in this country to contribute a little bit more
to reduce the deficit. (CPD, 2012)
In this statement, when clearly outlining how the deficit has been reduced, he attributes these
steps to himself, demonstrating how he has directly affected historical development in regards to
the reduction of the deficit.
As demonstrated, it is clear that Obama’s increased scores for values P1, P2, and P4
between his election to office in 2008 and his re-election in 2012 are anomalies, but they show
how his changing exigency and his rhetoric caused these increases. In 2008, Obama had painted
a very dark picture of the United States with his rhetoric, and in 2012, as the defending
incumbent president, had to put more optimistic faith in the situation that he had worked so hard
to improve during his first term in office.
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Conclusion
As rhetors, incumbent presidents change during this period, due to the lessons that they
have learned with their experience in office regarding their beliefs. Reagan, Clinton, and W.
Bush showed a decrease in P1 between their first and second elections, signifying that they
increasingly believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile. These three
candidates also showed a decrease for P2, showing an increasing pessimism regarding the
realization of their political values. This might be because the candidates might have attributed
the non-accomplishment of their political goals to the increasingly hostile universe. These
candidates also showed an increase for P4, meaning that they believed more in their effect on
control over historical development. This might come from an assumption that while they might
not have accomplished their goals as a result of a hostile political universe, their political
efficacy still ranked very high.
George H.W. Bush, who, in 1992, lost his re-election race, did not exhibit this winning
pattern. In contrast to the other candidates, he believed that the nature of the political universe
was friendlier, he was most optimistic about the realization of his political values, and that he
had less control over historical development than he did when he first entered office.
Obama’s score make his the anamoly of the successful incumbent presidential candidates.
He exhibited an increase for P1, P2, and P4, meaning that he believed that the nature of the
political universe was friendly, he was more optimistic about the realization of his political goals,
and that he had a higher sense of historical development. This unique increase in scores was due
to the fact that Obama’s rhetorical task was slightly different from that of Reagan, Clinton, or W.
Bush. Since Obama’s rhetoric portrayed the historical situation so negatively in his first election
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in 2008, he had to rhetorically craft a sentiment that the county was in a better place as an
incumbent president.
This trend outlining successful incumbent victories shows how presidents must shift their
rhetoric from their first election to their re-election. It will certainly be interesting to learn if this
incumbent trend regarding the relationship between the values of P1, P2, and P4 continues in the
future, but if it does not, it is clear that this trend does shine light on the changing rhetoric of
incumbent presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.
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THE 2004 ELECTION CASE STUDY: THE CLOSE RHETORIC
BETWEEN GEORGE W. BUSH AND JOHN KERRY
INTRODUCTION
The ultimate goal of campaign rhetoric is for candidates and their campaigns to match
their rhetoric to the audience’s needs and expectations. While some presidential candidates miss
the mark on rhetorically articulating their beliefs to their audience, John Kerry and George W.
Bush were both spot on for their presidential debate rhetoric in 2004. The 2004 debates
contained the closest mean scores across all values; P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2. Bush’s changes in
beliefs as an incumbent in the 2004 election also illustrate well the change in exigence between
elections, and Kerry’s similarities to Bush’s scores exemplify the Democrat’s ability to pick an
effective challenger against their opponent. This case study is going to explain the scores and
their similarities, and the significance of those similarities.
The 2004 Election and the Candidate’s Exigence in Relation to Kairos
Looking at the historical occurrences that surrounded the 2004 election, there was a very
tight focus surrounding debate issues, which explains one reason for why the scores are so close.
Right after the 2000 Presidential Elections, the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks occurred. Not long after,
new-to-office President Bush declared a War on Terror, and proceeded to invade Afghanistan to
hunt down Osama Bin Laden. Soon after, President George W. Bush invaded Iraq, calling for the
urgent removal of Saddam Hussein, claiming that Iraq was harboring weapons of mass
destruction. At first, the war was portrayed to be a quick and easy invasion, however, after it was
found that there were no weapons of mass destruction to be found in Iraq or a foreseeable end
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date to the war, the Iraq War turned sour in the eyes of the American electorate, creating a
significant anti-war sentiment across the nation.
These historical factors had creating a roaring kairotic exigence that was desperate for a
response during the 2004 election. Since these international events were the most significant
events that had occurred in the past four years, there was a tight focus on these issues during the
presidential debates, which illustrates, in part, Bush’s and Kerry’s mean scores were so similar.
According to the Commission on Presidential Debates, all three debates featured questions
surrounding these foreign policy issues (CPD, 2012).
Through a kairotic lens, in an immediate post-9/11 world, there was no room for a
friendly view of the universe in the eyes of the American electorate—terrorism was abound and
a fearful force to be reckoned with in the world. To match this sentiment, Bush and Kerry
resonated this same message throughout their presidential debate rhetoric. While Bush portrayed
himself as a decisive leader who would defend America against terrorism, Kerry tried to
capitalize on the current anti-war sentiments (CPD, 2012).
Bush and Kerry’s presidential debate rhetoric illustrate their successful use of kairos to
resonate with their audience’s more fearful and cynical attitudes toward terrorism, as exemplified
by the drop in mean scores for P1, P2, I1 and I2 dropped from 2000-2004. Essentially, this
means that they both saw the nature of the political universe as more hostile, they were more
pessimistic about the realization of political values, and they believed that more conflict-oriented
strategies and tactics were necessary as a result of the post-9/11 era.
In regards to the decrease for P1, nature of the political universe, it was clear that the
candidates were responding to the kairotic exigence of living in a world more prone to terrorism,
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revealing that they believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile than in the
2000 debates:
BUSH: After 9/11, we had to look at the world differently. After 9/11, we had to
recognize that when we saw a threat, we must take it seriously before it comes to hurt us.
In the old days we’d see a threat, and we could deal with it if we felt like it or not. But
9/11 changed it all. (CPD, 2004)
As stated here, Bush depicts that the nature of the political universe has become more hostile
because of the events that occurred on September 11th. As a result of a more hostile post-9/11
world, this mean that cooperative strategies and tactics would no longer be enough to work in the
real world or to satisfy the American people, which is why the candidates chose to use rhetoric
that echoed this conflict-minded sentiment.
The decrease for I1 and I2 can be accounted for the fact that terrorism increased the need
for a more conflict-oriented world strategy and tactics, war (as opposed to a more cooperative
strategy or tactic, like diplomacy).
BUSH: And I saw a unique threat in Saddam Hussein, as did my opponent, because we
thought he had weapons of mass destruction. And the unique threat was that he could
give weapons of mass destruction to an organization like Al Qaida, and the harm they
inflicted on us with airplanes would be multiplied greatly by weapons of mass
destruction. And that was the serious, serious threat. So I tried diplomacy, went to the
United Nations. But as we learned in the same report I quoted, Saddam Hussein was
gaming the oil-for-food program to get rid of sanctions. He was trying to get rid of
sanctions for a reason: He wanted to restart his weapons programs. We all thought there
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were weapons there, Robin. My opponent thought there were weapons there. That's why
he called him a grave threat. (CPD, 2004)
In this statement, Bush expresses his belief that diplomacy was not working well enough in his
dealings with Saddam Hussein, hinting that further action was necessary. Like Bush’s statement
above, Kerry leaned more toward war, a conflict-based strategy and tactic, in his sentiments as
well. Rhetorically, both were responding to the need for conflict-oriented strategies in this more
hostile environment, exhibiting qualities that the American people wanted in a president at the
time.
George W. Bush: Learning the Consequences of 9/11 in Office
The 2004 debates also showcased how incumbent candidates “learn” after spending their
first term in office. While all presidents in the study showed that they had “learned” throughout
their time in office, the September 11th attacks had taught President George W. Bush to look at
the world from a more cynical perspective. For all belief values, George W. Bush’s scores had
significant decreases. His P1 values had dropped from .4233 to .2033, a difference of .22. His P2
values had decreased from .2133 to .0767, a difference of .1366. His P4 values had remained the
same at .3367. His I1 values had dropped from .5933 to .4267, a difference of .1666. Finally, his
I2 values had decreased, from .2500 to .1867, a difference of .0633. By the time that the 2004
elections had come around, President Bush believed that the universe had changed for the worst
since 2000.
He believed that the political universe was more hostile, and that he had less control over
historical development before. During the 2000 presidential debates, he stated:
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BUSH: First question is what's in the best interests of the United States? What's in the
best interests of our people? When it comes to foreign policy that will be my guiding
question. Is it in our nation's interests? Peace in the Middle East is in our nation's
interests. Having a hemisphere that is free for trade and peaceful is in our nation's
interests. Strong relations in Europe is in our nation's interest. I've thought a lot about
what it means to be the president. I also understand that an administration is not one
person, but an administration is dedicated citizens who are called by the president to
serve the country, to serve a cause greater than self, and so I've thought about an
administration of people who represent all America, but people who understand my
compassionate and conservative philosophy. (CPD, 2000)
In 2004, his stance had become more hostile:
BUSH: This nation of ours has got a solemn duty to defeat this ideology of hate. And
that's what they are. This is a group of killers who will not only kill here, but kill children
in Russia, that'll attack unmercifully in Iraq, hoping to shake our will. We have a duty to
defeat this enemy. We have a duty to protect our children and grandchildren. The best
way to defeat them is to never waver, to be strong, to use every asset at our disposal, is to
constantly stay on the offensive and, at the same time, spread liberty. (CPD, 2004)
It’s obvious that the presidency gave George W. Bush a much different, more hostile view of the
world. As demonstrated by the debate rhetoric above, in 2000, Bush talked about a less hostile
environment, speaking of peace in terms of our national interest. This is drastically different
from the stance he developed after his post-9/11 presidency in 2004, where he speaks of “an
ideology of hate,” and a motivation to defeat the enemy. George W. Bush had been able to take
50

what he had learned during his first term in office and rhetorically articulated these newfound
beliefs of a more hostile world to win the 2004 election.
He was also more pessimistic about the prospects for the realization of his political
values, and now believed that conflict-oriented strategies and tactics were the most effective ones
in the universe.
BUSH: I agree with him. The world is better off without Saddam Hussein. I was hoping
diplomacy would work. I understand the serious consequences of committing our troops
into harm's way. It's the hardest decision a president makes. So I went to the United
Nations. I didn't need anybody to tell me to go to the United Nations. I decided to go
there myself. And I went there hoping that, once and for all, the free world would act in
concert to get Saddam Hussein to listen to our demands. They passed the resolution that
said, "Disclose, disarm, or face serious consequences." I believe, when an international
body speaks, it must mean what it says. Saddam Hussein had no intention of disarming.
Why should he? He had 16 other resolutions and nothing took place. As a matter of fact,
my opponent talks about inspectors. The facts are that he was systematically deceiving
the inspectors. That wasn't going to work. That's kind of a pre-September 10th mentality,
the hope that somehow resolutions and failed inspections would make this world a more
peaceful place. He was hoping we'd turn away. But there was fortunately others beside
myself who believed that we ought to take action. (CPD, 2004).
One reason for Bush’s increased pessimism regarding the realization of his political values is his
articulated experiences with the United Nations in dealing with Saddam Hussein. In this
experience, it’s clear that his political values were not realized to his satisfaction. As a result, he
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rhetorically articulated his desire for more conflict-oriented tactics and strategies where he says
that “there were others beside myself that believed that we ought to take action.” This excerpt
further illustrates the increases in Bush’s pessimism regarding this value, as he had learned
during his time in office that cooperative-oriented strategies and tactics were not enough to see
his political values realized in office.
John Kerry: The Embodiment of Kairos Himself
John Kerry, as a candidate himself, embodies kairos as a rhetor. In order to properly meet
the needs of an American electorate who saw the world just as cynically as President Bush did,
the Democrats needed someone who was well-versed in foreign policy, who could echo these
same sentiments, as well as have the capability to credibly criticize the President’s misguidance
in handling the major events in his presidency that caused these sentiments in the first place. In
order to fulfill the need of the “foreign-policy president” in a post-9/11 world, the Democrats
thought that it would be wisest to choose Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts as their
candidate. Kerry, a celebrated and experienced war veteran and Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, was one of the most qualified foreign-policy experts in the Democratic
Party (this still stands today, as he currently serves as Secretary of State under President Barack
Obama). The similar of mean scores between John Kerry and George W. Bush exemplify the
Democrats’ extraordinary effort in picking a candidate who could give their opponent a healthy
source of opposition during the debates and the election.
While Kerry was very closely matched with President Bush in mean belief scores, he
might have rhetorically overshot his cynicism, citing his overall loss in the election. For every
value except for P4, his belief in historical control, he had scored lower mean scores than Bush.
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Kerry’s overshot cynicism lies in his exigence in trying to rhetorically defeat President Bush. As
President, George W. Bush’s exigency had the task of responding to a cynical world, but one in
which he was still able to lead. Kerry’s exigence had the harder task of responding to a more
hostile world and criticizing the president’s actions in addressing that hostile world, leaving him
little room to do much else in his presidential debate rhetoric.
Kerry rhetorically articulated that he believed that the nature of the political universe was
more hostile than Bush, just under by .0266.
KERRY: Now, how do we achieve it is the most critical component of it. I believe that
this president, regrettably, rushed us into a war, made decisions about foreign policy,
pushed alliances away. And, as a result, America is now bearing this extraordinary
burden where we are not as safe as we ought to be. The measurement is not: Are we
safer? The measurement is: Are we as safe as we ought to be? And there are a host of
options that this president had available to him, like making sure that at all our ports in
America containers are inspected. Only 95 percent of them -- 95 percent come in today
uninspected. That's not good enough. People who fly on airplanes today, the cargo hold is
not X-rayed, but the baggage is. That's not good enough. Firehouses don't have enough
firefighters in them. Police officers are being cut from the streets of America because the
president decided to cut the COPS program. So we can do a better job of homeland
security. I can do a better job of waging a smarter, more effective war on terror and
guarantee that we will go after the terrorists. (CPD, 2004)
In the excerpt above, it is obvious that Kerry is spread pretty thin with the amount of things that
his exigence has to respond to in this one passage. Kerry has a very complicated exigence, as he
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has to refute the President’s record and contrast it with his own stance and policies of how he
would do better, also while resonating with the American people as he articulates his beliefs.
This complicated exigence is illustrated many times in the statement above where Kerry first sets
up his rhetoric by portraying a country in need (“America is not as safe as it ought to be”),
presenting an alternative option to the American people (“The measurement is, ‘Are we as safe
as we ought to be?’”), contrasting himself from the president (“not good enough”), and
establishing himself as the alternative leader (“I can do a better job of waging a smarter, more
effective war on terror…”). This was an awful lot for Kerry to exude in less than a moment’s
time, illustrating why his multi-faceted exigence essentially bogged him down in the rhetorical
articulation of his beliefs, portraying himself as the more negative candidate in this aspect.
Kerry’s P2 values were only .0100 lower than Bush’s, and his I2 values were only .0034
lower than Bush’s scores, exhibiting only slightly more pessimism regarding the realization of
his political values and conflict-oriented tactics than President Bush.
KERRY: I can make American safer than President Bush has made us. And I believe
President Bush and I both love our country equally. But we just have a different set of
convictions about how you make America safe. I believe America is safest and strongest
when we are leading the world and we are leading strong alliances. I'll never give a veto
to any country over our security. But I also know how to lead those alliances. This
president has left them in shatters across the globe, and we're now 90 percent of the
casualties in Iraq and 90 percent of the costs. I think that's wrong, and I think we can do
better. I have a better plan for homeland security. I have a better plan to be able to fight
the war on terror by strengthening our military, strengthening our intelligence, by going
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after the financing more authoritatively, by doing what we need to do to rebuild the
alliances, by reaching out to the Muslim world, which the president has almost not done,
and beginning to isolate the radical Islamic Muslims, not have them isolate the United
States of America. I know I can do a better job in Iraq. I have a plan to have a summit
with all of the allies, something this president has not yet achieved, not yet been able to
do to bring people to the table. We can do a better job of training the Iraqi forces to
defend themselves, and I know that we can do a better job of preparing for elections.
(CPD, 2004)
Again, this cynicism comes from the fact that Kerry’s complicated exigence had multiple tasks—
refuting the president, promoting his own presidential agenda, and resonating with the American
electorate. He even started off the above opening statement by immediately contrasting himself
with President Bush. Every time he mentioned a “better plan,” or a “better job,” he was trying to
strike Bush within his rhetoric. It was in this way that Kerry had to out-bet the President with his
beliefs, since he figured that simply matching George W. Bush in his rhetoric was not going to
be enough. Kerry’s score, slightly lower than Bush’s, exemplifies his struggle with his exigence
in this way.
It seems, according to the data, that Kerry’s extra degree of cynicism held the key to
President Bush’s successes in the election. Interestingly enough, however, John Kerry won the
two debates that Bush had lost, the third debate between them resulting in a tie.
Conclusion
The 2004 Presidential Debates illustrate just how closely George W. Bush and John
Kerry were able to match their exigence to the kairos of the post-9/11 world.
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The September 11th Terrorist Attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the War on Iraq
created a roaring exigence and tight focus that the candidates were eager to respond to during the
2004 presidential debates. In responding to this exigence, the candidates tailored their beliefs to
match the kairos of the time, which was more hostile and pessimistic than it was in 2004. These
historical events had caused a decrease in all scores, P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2, which spawned from
the negative rhetoric articulated about these events. Both Bush and Kerry saw the nature of the
political universe as more hostile, they both were more pessimistic about the realization of the
their political goals, and they believed that more conflict-oriented strategies were necessary in a
post-9/11 era.
Bush, the defending incumbent President, had taken the pessimistic lessons he had
learned in office, and used it to win re-election as the President who would lead the country
through these difficult times, which explains his decreases in scores across the board. Kerry
embodied kairos as a presidential candidate, being one of the most qualified and electable
foreign policy experts in the Democratic Party, he was able to echo Bush’s concerns about living
in a post-9/11 world while credibly criticizing his incumbent opponent. Even though Kerry’s
scores were very similar to Bush’s it seems that Kerry overshot his cynicism due to his
complicated exigence in the 2004 debates, citing his loss in the 2004 election.
Both Kerry and Bush were highly accurate in their ability to capitalize on the kairotic
beliefs and events of the 2004 election, something that was never accomplished in the debates
that took place before their election or after.
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INDEPENDENTS: JOHN ANDERSON AND ROSS PEROT, AND THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
INTRODUCTION
The United States has a very dominating two party system. As a result, independents tend
to be left out or pushed to the side of major party candidates for a couple of reasons. First, when
independents run as candidates in presidential election, their popular ideas get swallowed or
stolen by the major party candidates. It is in this way that independents pull major party
candidates more to the left or to the right, but this ends up harming independents in their own
candidacy. In addition, independent candidates tend to take away votes from each of the major
party candidates.
In studying the Operational Codes of independent presidential candidates John B.
Anderson and Ross Perot, it further proved that third party candidates don’t work well in the US
two-party system because they are either not mainstream enough or rhetorically accurate enough
to win. John B. Anderson’s Operational Code beliefs had rhetorically missed the mark compared
to the Operational Codes of his major party candidates. Ross Perot’s Operational Code mean
scores, which often fell between those of his major-party opponents, illustrated how he was able
to take away some of his major-party opponents’ voting population, but not to a high enough
degree to win the presidency.
John B. Anderson: Rhetorically Missing the Mark
John B. Anderson was a representative in the U.S. House for his district in Illinois.
Although he was originally a Republican during his time in the House, he declared himself as an
Independent for the 1980 presidential election, and made it onto the ballot in all fifty states.
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Anderson’s candidacy and platform were considered to be right-winged, but not as much as
ultra-conservative Reagan. John B. Anderson received 6.61% of the vote, while Democrat and
incumbent President Jimmy Carter won 41.04% of the vote and 7 states, and Republican winner
Ronald Reagan won 50.75% of the vote and 43 states.
Jimmy Carter, the Democratic incumbent, had spent four years in office. Many in the
electorate had thought that Carter had handled the Iran Hostage crisis in a terrible manner
(Abramson et al., 1982). In addition to the hostage crisis, a poor economy had emerged during
Carter’s presidency, resulting in inflation and high unemployment rates (Abramson et al., 1982).
According to Abramson et al., Carter tried to defend his position in office by giving off vibe that
“Reagan is awful. Don’t vote for him’” (1982). Reagan, the Republican challenger, heavily
criticized the Carter presidency, claiming that “’Carter was a failure, but I will do better. Here is
my program. It is different from his, so you know that I will not repeat the same mistakes’”
(Abramson et. al, 1982). As the Independent candidate, Anderson had to foster a position
between the two major party candidates, portraying himself as “different from and preferable to
both Reagan and Carter (Abramson et al., 1982).
ANDERSON: President Carter was not right a few weeks ago when he said that the
American people were confronted with only two choices, with only two men, and with
only two parties. I think you've seen tonight in this debate that Governor Reagan and I
have agreed on exactly one thing - we are both against the reimposition of a peacetime
draft. We have disagreed, I believe, on virtually every other issue. I respect him for
showing tonight - for appearing here, and I thank the League of Women Voters for the
opportunity that they have given me. I am running for President as an Independent
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because I believe our country is in trouble. I believe that all of us are going to have to
begin to work together to solve our problems. (CPD, 1980).
Anderson’s strategy might have not been the best idea, as most of his Operational Code scores
were way off from those his fellow major-party opponents. Reflecting upon the percentage of the
vote that he received from the American electorate, it is clear that his strategy of trying to stand
out from his major party opponents left him out in the cold instead. This was because, in regards
to kairos, the American electorate was looking for a conservative like Reagan to replace Carter,
as they were dissatisfied with his performance in office. Anderson had the easy task of speaking
with an exigence that separated himself from liberal Carter, but also had to distinguish himself
from also-conservative Reagan in the same exigence—a much more difficult task. By putting
himself in a place that distanced himself from both candidates, even the one favored by the
audience in terms of kairos, Anderson ended up articulating beliefs that did not resonate with the
American electorate in a manner that was appropriate to their needs, wants and expectations in a
president at the time.
Anderson’s belief in his ability to control historical development, much different than
that of Carter’s and Reagans, did not sit well with the American electorate. Anderson’s mean
score for P4, .3200 falls way above Reagan’s and Carter’s scores, .2650 and .1700 respectively.
Even though Anderson was ideologically close to conservative Reagan, he was very different on
this value from his Republican counterpart. Anderson’s high belief and articulation of his own
control of historical development shows that he was rhetorically “off” on this value.
ANDERSON: I believe that all of us are going to have to begin to work together to solve
our problems…and therefore, I think you ought to consider doing something about it, and
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voting for an Independent in 1980. You know, a generation of office seekers has tried to
tell the American people that they could get something for nothing. It's been a time,
therefore, of illusion and false hopes, and the longer it continues, the more dangerous it
becomes. We've got to stop drifting.
By asking the American people to “do something about it,” he’s rhetorically reflecting his own
values on the American people, implying that he’s going to “do something about it” and blow
past the “generation of office seekers that [have told] the American people that they could get
something for nothing” like major-party candidates Carter and Reagan. In this way, Anderson
was over-compensating for his desire to stand out, because he wasn’t exactly on point about
major parties. As illustrated by the statement above, it was clear that he thought that the
American people did not want a major party candidate at all—but the truth was, they weren’t fed
up with the major party system just yet, it’s just that they desperately wanted someone else in
office.
Other scores which illustrate Anderson’s failed attempt of standing from the major party
candidates are his mean scores for I1 and I2, citing his beliefs for the approach and pursuit of
goals, respectively. Anderson’s mean score for I1 of .5800 is way, way above Reagan’s (.3700)
and Carter’s (.3700), which had an identical mean score for this value. This shows that the
parties and candidates hit this value right on the money in terms of audience, believing and
saying that a somewhat cooperative-oriented strategy was the best in the universe. On the other
hand, it shows that Anderson’s belief that a very cooperative-oriented strategy was the best in the
universe, his belief as an independent candidate that did not resonate with the mainstream
American electorate. Anderson’s mean score for I2, .1900, is a little above Reagan’s mean score
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of .1050 and Carter’s mean score of .1200, which are pretty close together. While Reagan and
Carter were relatively close in believing that less cooperative tactics were most effective at the
time, Anderson was not mainstream enough in believing that somewhat cooperative tactics what
were most effective for the time period.
Anderson’s score for P2, the prospects for the realization of his political values, actually
falls in-between those of his major-party opponents. Anderson’s mean score, .1800, falls right
between Carter’s at .3600 and Reagan’s at .0500. While Carter was optimistic about the
prospects for the realization of his political values, Reagan was almost pessimistic. While it’s
possible that Carter’s optimism in this regard could be a factor in the debates that relates to his
loss in the election, it was Anderson’s in-between attitude on this belief that did not resonate well
with the American electorate.
ANDERSON: When these Presidential Debates were held just four years ago, I
remember the incumbent President, who was willing to debate, President Ford, telling the
American people that they simply ought not to vote for somebody who promised more
than they could deliver. Well, we've seen what has happened. We haven't gotten either
the economies in Government that were promised; we haven't gotten the 4% inflation that
we were supposed to get at the end of Mr. Carter's first term. Instead we had, I think, in
the second quarter, a Consumer Price Index registering around 12%. And nobody really
knows, with the latest increase in the Wholesale Price Index - that's about 18% on an
annualized basis - what it's going to be. Let me say this. I think my programs are far less
inflationary than those of Governor Reagan…I've been very careful - I have been very
careful in saying that what I'm going to do is to bring Federal spending under control
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first. I would like to stand here and promise the American people a tax cut, as Governor
Reagan has done. But, you know, it's gotten to be about $122 difference. Somebody
worked it out. And they figured out that between the tax cut that Governor Reagan is
promising the American people, and the tax cut that Jimmy Carter is promising in 198I,
his is worth about $122 more. So you, dear voters, are out there on the auction block, and
these two candidates are bidding for your votes. And one is going to give you $122 more
if you happen to be in that range of about a $20,000-a-year income. I'm going to wait
until I see that that inflation rate is going down, before I even begin to phase in the
business tax cuts that I've talked about. But I think, by improving productivity, they
would be far less inflationary than the consumption-oriented tax cut that Governor
Reagan is recommending.
In this passage, Anderson basically tried to lay himself in a position between that of Carter and
Reagan by saying that he is not going to bring federal spending under control until the inflation
rate comes down. However, this plan did not resonate well with the American people because the
third option he provided is one that said, “wait and see.” The American people did not think that
they had time for a “wait and see” kind of plan to control federal spending, they wanted a plan of
action that was different from Carter’s which was why voters chose Reagan for the Presidency.
The only value that held Anderson relatively close to a major party candidate was P1,
citing his belief about the nature of the political universe. Anderson’s mean score for P1, .2500,
came close to Reagan’s score of .2250, which were both well below Carter’s mean score
of.5000. This exhibits how Anderson was ideologically conservative like Reagan, who both saw
the nature of the political universe as more hostile than Carter.
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The Operational Code scores of independent John B. Anderson show that this belief
rhetorically missed the mark for the election of 1980. As an independent, Anderson’s beliefs
were not mainstream enough to win a significant amount of votes from the American electorate,
further illustrating how independent candidates do not work well in the United States’
dominating two-party system.
Ross Perot: Not Enough to Win the Presidency
Ross Perot was an American businessman from Texas that decided to run for office as an
independent in 1992. Perot’s campaign and rhetoric capitalized on the American electorate’s fear
of the looming deficit, as well as his independence from the Democratic and Republican parties.
He ran as an independent candidate in 1992 against Democrat Bill Clinton and Republican
incumbent President George H. W. Bush. Perot was able to get his name on the ballot in all 50
states. Perot ended up receiving 19% of the popular vote, while Bush received 37% of the vote,
and Clinton won with 43% of the vote (Abramson et al., 1995). Perot was one of the main
deciding factors that made Bill Clinton one of the few presidents to actually win the presidency
with less than 50% of the vote (Abramson et al., 1995). Perot’s substantial share of the popular
vote had taken away votes from the two major party candidates, but not enough to become the
first independent president.
George H. W. Bush, the Republican incumbent, had a relatively good first term as
president. He had done a good job with the Persian Gulf War, and had high approval ratings at
the time (Abramson et al., 1995). The only problem was, the 1992 elections were more focused
on domestic issues, such as the economy, leaving little chance for Bush to shine in his area of
expertise, foreign policy. The public had fears about the looming federal budget deficit, and the
63

economy worsened as Election Day drew closer (Abramson et al., 1995). Clinton and Perot were
able to capitalize their campaign rhetoric around the deficit, Clinton citing his famous tagline,
“It’s the economy, stupid!” while providing a plan to lessen the gap between the rich the poor,
while Perot was able to use his stance as a successful businessman to speak out against NAFTA
and the national debt (Abramson et. Al, 1995). While Perot’s Operational Code scores showed
that he was definitely mainstream enough in the eyes of the American electorate, it appears that
he was not rhetorically accurate enough to win the election.
Perot’s Operational Code score for P1, citing his belief in the nature of the political
universe, illustrate this sentiment. Perot’s mean score of .4000 falls between Clinton’s score of
.4733 and Bush’s score .3800, meaning that his beliefs and rhetoric were not off the chart’s like
Anderson’s. However, Perot’s score is closer to Bush’s score than Clinton’s. Perot and Bush saw
the political universe much more hostile than Clinton did, which is why they both lost the
election.
PEROT: But I just find it fascinating that while we sit here tonight we will go into debt
an additional $50 million in an hour and a half. Now, it's not the Republicans' fault, of
course, and it's not the Democrats' fault. And what I'm looking for is who did it? Now,
they're the 2 folks involved so maybe if you put them together, they did it. Now, the facts
are we have to fix it. I'm here tonight for these young people up here in the balcony from
this college. When I was a young man, when I got out of the Navy I had multiple job
offers. Young people with high grades can't get a job. People -- the 18- to 24-year-old
high school graduates 10 years ago were making more than they are now. In other words,
we were down to 18% of them were making -- 18- to 24-year- olds were making less than
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$12,000. Now that's up to 40%. And what's happened in the meantime? The dollar's gone
through the floor. Now, whose fault is that? Not the Democrats. Not the Republicans.
Somewhere out there there's an extraterrestrial that's doing this to us, I guess. And
everybody says they take responsibility. Somebody somewhere has to take responsibility
for this. Put it to you bluntly, American people. If you want me to be your president,
we're going to face our problems. We’ll deal with our problems, we’ll solve our
problems. We'll down our debt. We'll pass on the American dream to our children, and I
will not leave our children a situation that they have today. When I was a boy it took 2
generations to double the standard of living. Today it will take 12 generations. Our
children will not see the American dream because of this debt that somebody somewhere
dropped on us. (CPD, 1992)
By contrasting what the world was like when he “was a young man” to the current economic
situation, Perot is exemplifying that the nature of the political universe is more hostile than it
used to be, resulting in the current economic plight. Even though he uses this contrast to put
down the two major parties (and sarcastically, the “extraterrestrials”) and raise himself up as the
“above politics” solution to America’s economic problems, the fact that he still portrays the
nature of the political universe as more hostile attributes to his loss in the election.
The results are similar for Perot’s standings for P2, his beliefs regarding the realization of
his political values. Perot’s mean score for P2, .2000, falls between Clinton’s mean score of
.2500 and Bush’s score of .1833, but again, is closer to Bush’s score than it is to Clinton’s. This
shows that as an independent candidate, Perot was close in appealing to this value, but was not
close enough, as his opponents had scores that were more polarized. Clinton’s score, being the
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highest of the three candidates, showed that he was the most optimistic about the prospects for
the realization of his political values. Illustrated by the fact that Perot’s was closer to Bush’s
score, the lowest of all three candidates, it was clear that Perot’s score might have been moderate
and not “off,” but his optimism was not as high as Clinton’s. Rhetorically, with an economy that
was worsening, Clinton’s optimism in this regard was what the American people needed in a
president.
For I1, Perot’s scores again illustrate his mainstream qualities but also illustrate how he
did not win the election with his beliefs regarding the approach of goals. I1 had the largest range
out of all of the values for the 1992 election, with Clinton at the top of the range and Bush on the
bottom, and Perot in the middle. Perot’s mean score of .4767 falls right between Clinton’s score
of .5833 and Bush’s score of .2433. In this case, it’s not like Perot is off on this score, it’s just
that he did not believe that a cooperation-oriented strategy was effective to the effect that Clinton
did, illustrating why voters might have gravitated more towards Clinton than they did to Perot.
Perot’s scores for the pursuit of goals are very much like his scores for other values.
Perot’s mean score of .1733 falls between Clinton’s score of .2533 and Bush’s score of .0633,
but is slightly closer to Clinton’s. Like the mean scores for I1, the mean scores for I2 have a
large range, with Clinton on top, Perot in the middle, and Bush on the bottom. Again, Perot was
able to position himself as someone who believed that somewhat cooperative strategies were the
most effective in the universe to a degree that was in between the Democrat and the Republican
opponents, but apparently, it was not enough.
PEROT: If the American people want to do it and not talk about it, then they ought to -you know, I'm one person they ought to consider. If they just want to keep slow dancing
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and talk about it and not do it, I'm not your man. I am results-oriented. I am action
oriented. I've dealt my businesses. Getting things done in three months that my
competitors took 18 months to do. Everybody says you can't do that with Congress. Sure,
you can do that with Congress. Congress -- they're all good people. They're all patriots
but you've got to link arms and work with them. Sure, you'll have arguments. Sure, you'll
have fights. We have them all day every day. But we get the job done.
This statement is not very out of the ordinary from other generic campaign stump speeches of
presidential candidates, talking about getting rid of the gridlock in Congress in order to get
something done. During an election where the economy was in bad shape, the American
electorate wanted something to be done, and felt that there wasn’t enough time to a president that
would argue back and forth with Congress. Therefore, while Perot’s statement above is powerful,
it does not set him above or apart from the other candidates.
P4 was the only value for which Perot did not score between the two major-party
candidates. Perot’s score of .2667 falls way below Clinton’s score of .3133 and Bush’s score of
.3667. Like Anderson, Perot was way off on portraying this value through his beliefs and his
rhetoric because his score on this value was much lower than those of the scores of his majorparty counterparts. In this way, Perot was not able to appeal enough to the kairos of that election.
Perot’s Operational Code scores illustrate how mainstream his ideas were to the
American electorate at the time, but also why he did not end up winning the election of 1992.
Conclusion: The Difference Between Anderson and Perot
Major-party candidates usually count on their political parties to hustle votes for them, by
way of providing a familiar ideology that voters can relate to, money, resources, and experts. To
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major-party candidates, these things are considered to be automatic, but independents must
provide these things for themselves. Therefore, while major-party candidates can coast by during
elections on things other than their beliefs and ideas, beliefs and ideas are what set the
independents apart from their major-party candidates.
For John B. Anderson, his beliefs deterred people from voting from him. Anderson
received 6.61% of the vote, and zero states. He ran against incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter
and Republican Ronald Reagan. As an independent candidate, Anderson had to rhetorically
separate himself from his two major-party opponents. As exemplified by most of his mean scores
for the Operational Code belief values, it’s obvious that his beliefs were not rhetorically ready
for the time period. Anderson’s scores for P4, I1, and I2 were rhetorically far off from both
Carter’s and Reagan’s scores. Anderson’s belief scores exhibit that he rhetorically missed the
mark in terms of kairos and audience.
As for Perot, his beliefs were not “off” like Anderson’s—Perot was able to rhetorically
and kairotically match his beliefs to the audience during the election of 1992, however, it just
wasn’t enough to win him the presidency. Perot had earned 19% of the vote during his run for
office, and similarly, his Operational Code scores were much more mainstream than Anderson’s.
Perot, running again Republican incumbent George H.W. Bush and Democratic challenger Bill
Clinton, had crafted his rhetoric to capitalize on America’s fears about the looming deficit.
Perot’s Operational Code Scores for values P1, P2, I1, and I2 fell between those of Bush’s and
Clinton’s. While his rhetoric was certainly kairotic and mainstream, it was not enough for him to
win the election.
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With both of these candidates, it seems that their beliefs were not rhetorically matched
enough for the audience to vote to disrupt the long-dominant two-party system of the United
States. Anderson’s beliefs left him out in the cold compared to his major-party opponents,
causing him to receive 6.61% of the vote. While Perot was able to rock the boat with his 19% of
the vote, he did not receive enough votes to tip the boat over. These results further prove that
independent candidates do not work well the United States’ dominant two-party system. Both
Anderson and Perot were not able to become the first non-major-party candidate to win the
presidency, and the rhetorical articulations of their beliefs illustrate one factor in that result.
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CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this research project, I set out to find 1) what beliefs were apparent
and consistent over time, 2) if beliefs were exclusive to party lines, and 3) whether winners and
losers of debates have similar beliefs. The answers that I found were clear cut and simple.
The answers that I found were clear-cut and simple: In examining the evolution of beliefs from
1976-2012, it was found that belief values rose and fell together for almost every election, with
only some anomalies. In examining whether Democratic and Republican candidates have similar
operational code scores in-party, it was found that scores are not consistent on the basis of party.
In other words, scores rose and fell together in terms of party lines. In finding out of there were
certain beliefs that all debate and elections winners or losers share, it was evident that
presidential candidates were all over the map—in other words, there was no specific evidence
from the operational code scores that could necessarily determine a winner or loser of a debate,
or the election.
However, finding the answers to these questions did not constitute the end of the quest to
examine Operational Code beliefs as articulated in presidential debates by presidential
candidates. These answers gave way to more detailed, more thought-provoking questions about
the rise and fall of beliefs during election cycles. In studying the candidacy of Ronald, it was
found that Reagan’s electoral victories were so significant that other opponents tried to match on
certain belief levels, but still came up short. In studying the incumbent candidates in this study, it
was found that incumbents comfortably had similar score patterns regarding the relationships
between their mean scores for P1, P2, and P4, citing their view of the nature of the political
universe, their optimism or pessimism regarding the nature of political values, and their sense of
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control over historical development. Lastly, the study of the two independent candidates in the
study, John B. Anderson and Ross Perot, further proved through Operational Code beliefs the
reasons why independent presidential candidates don’t succeed in the dominating two-party
system of the United States. In studying the 2004 election between John Kerry and George W.
Bush, it was found that these two candidates had the closest rhetoric of all of the election cycles
due to their rhetorical articulations regarding the post-9/11 era, but since Kerry overshot his
rhetorical cynicism in expressing his beliefs, Bush came out on top.
Still, there are many questions left unanswered throughout these case studies regarding
the relationship between rising and falling Operational Code scores and the rhetorical situation.
Options for further study could include looking at the difference in scores that candidates had
from individual debate to debate, post-Cold War era rhetoric and how that impacted the
Operational Code scores of candidates in those elections, and how the integrity and receptivity of
certain candidates affected the way in which they scored for certain values of the Operational
Code.
Rhetoric and beliefs are two major driving factors in presidential debates and campaigns.
Pulling from the rhetorical situation of each election, presidential candidates have been able to
successfully win the presidency based on their beliefs and their rhetoric. Presidential debates add
to this rhetoric momentum, allowing candidates to express their viewpoint, and more
importantly, the chance to triumph over their opponent. By examining Operational Code scores
of presidential candidates through the beliefs they articulate through a rhetorical lens, it is even
more apparent how rhetoric truly drives the beliefs that have dominated the American political
system for years.
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APPENDIX A: OPERATIONAL CODE SCORES AND VALUES
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Value
Name

Phil
oso
phic
al
Me
ani
ng

I1

App
roac
h to
goal
s
(dir
ecti
on
of
strat
egy)

Calculated by subtracting
the number of negative
verbs from the number of
positive verbs and dividing
the result by total number
of negative and positive
verbs.

I2

Purs
uit
of
goal
s
(inte
nsit
y of
tacti
cs)

Calculated by multiplying
each verb by the scale
values associated with its
coding category, summing
the results, then calculating
the average (mean) score
and dividing it by three.

I3

Risk
orie
ntati
on
(ave
rse/
acce
ptan
t)

How It’s Calculated

Takes into account the
dispersion of verbs.
Employs a measure of
dispersion, the Index of
Qualitative Variation
(IQV) which assesses the
variation in the distribution
of observations among the
six categories for self and
others.

Degrees of the Value

-1 (Extremely Conflict) through +1
(Extremely Cooperation)
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | -.50
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0
(extremely)

-1 (Extremely Conflict) through +1
(Extremely Cooperation)
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | .50
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0
(extremely)

0.0 (Risk Averse) through 1.0 (Risk
Acceptant)
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very
High)

Calculated separately for
self and other attributions,
the IQV scores is
subtracted from 1.0 to

73

Interpretation

He/she believes that
a _____ _____oriented direction is
the best strategy in
this universe.
He/she believes that
a definitely
cooperativeoriented direction is
the best strategy in
this universe. (-.50)
He/she believes that
_____ _____ tactics
are best under this
condition.
He/she believes that
somewhat
cooperative tactics
are best under this
condition. (+.25)

As a leader, he/she
is relatively ______
to risk.
As a leader, he/she
is relatively very
acceptant to risk.
(.93)

estimate the predictability
of this value.

I4a

I4b

Punish

Tim
ing
of
Acti
on:
flexi
bilit
y of
coo
p/co
nf
tacti
cs
Tim
ing
of
Acti
on:
Flex
ibili
ty of
wor
d/de
ed
tacti
cs

Utili
ty of
Mea
ns:
Con
flict
Mea
ns
(I5)
(De
eds)

Utili
Threaten ty of
Mea

Calculated by subtracting
the absolute value of the
balance index for
cooperation/conflict from
one.

Calculated by subtracting
the absolute value of the
balance index for
words/deeds from one.

0.0 (Flexibility) through 1.0
(Flexibility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very
High)

0.0 (Flexibility) through 1.0
(Flexibility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very
High)

A leader’s
propensity to shift
between
cooperative/conflict
ual tactics is ____.
A leader’s
propensity to shift
between
cooperative/conflict
ual tactics is
extremely low. (.07)

A leaders
propensity to shift
between word and
deed tactics is
______.
A leader’s
propensity to shift
between word and
deed tactics is high.
(.74)

A series of proportion
indices measure the
leader’s beliefs
The medium proportion of
equal utility each this value
is .16.
Proportions that exceed or
fail to reach that level are
assigned higher or lower
descriptions of utility.
Can be analyzed
proportionately or by its
descriptor.
A series of proportion
indices measure the
leader’s beliefs

0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very
High)

0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16
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A leader’s
propensity to punish
is ______.
A leader’s
propensity is very
high. (.31)

A leader’s reliance
on threaten tactics is
_______.

ns:
Con
flict
Mea
ns
(I5)
(Wo
rds)

Oppose

Appeal

Promise

Utili
ty of
Mea
ns:
Con
flict
Mea
ns
(I5)
(Wo
rds)

Utili
ty of
Mea
ns:
Coo
pera
tive
Mea
ns
(I5)
(Wo
rds)

Utili
ty of
Mea

The medium proportion of
equal utility each this value
is .16.

(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very
High)

A leader’s reliance
on threaten tactics is
very low. (.02)

Proportions that exceed or
fail to reach that level are
assigned higher or lower
descriptions of utility.
Can be analyzed
proportionately or by its
descriptor.
A series of proportion
indices measure the
leader’s beliefs
The medium proportion of
equal utility each this value
is .16.
Proportions that exceed or
fail to reach that level are
assigned higher or lower
descriptions of utility.

0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very
High)

A leader’s reliance
on oppose tactics is
_________.
A leader’s reliance
on oppose tactics is
medium. (.15)

Can be analyzed
proportionately or by its
descriptor.
A series of proportion
indices measure the
leader’s beliefs
The medium proportion of
equal utility each this value
is .16.
Proportions that exceed or
fail to reach that level are
assigned higher or lower
descriptions of utility.
Can be analyzed
proportionately or by its
descriptor.
A series of proportion
indices measure the
leader’s beliefs

0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very
High)

0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16
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A leader’s reliance
on appeal tactics is
_________.
A leader’s reliance
on appeal tactics is
very high. (.30)

A leader’s reliance
on promise tactics is
________.

ns:
Coo
pera
tive
Mea
ns
(I5)
(De
eds)

Reward

Utili
ty of
Mea
ns:
Coo
pera
tive
Mea
ns
(I5)
(De
eds)

The medium proportion of
equal utility each this value
is .16.

(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very
High)

A leader’s reliance
on promise tactics is
low. (.07)

Proportions that exceed or
fail to reach that level are
assigned higher or lower
descriptions of utility.
Can be analyzed
proportionately or by its
descriptor.
A series of proportion
indices measure the
leader’s beliefs
The medium proportion of
equal utility each this value
is .16.
Proportions that exceed or
fail to reach that level are
assigned higher or lower
descriptions of utility.

0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very
High)

A leader’s reliance
on reward tactics is
________.
A leader’s reliance
on reward tactics is
high. (.25)

Can be analyzed
proportionately or by its
descriptor.

P1

Nat
ure
of
the
polit
ical
univ
erse

Calculated by subtracting
the number of negative
verbs from the number of
positive verbs and dividing
the result by total number
of negative and positive
verbs.

P2

Pros
pect
s for
reali
zati
on
of
polit
ical

Calculated by multiplying
each verb by the scale
values associated with its
coding category, summing
the results, then calculating
the average (mean) score
and dividing it by three.

-1 (Extremely Hostile) through +1
(Extremely Friendly)
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | .50
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0
(extremely)
-1 (Pessimism) through +1
(Optimism)
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | .50
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0
(extremely)
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He/she believes that
the political
universe is ______
_______.
He/she believes that
the political
universe is
somewhat hostile.
(-.25)
He/she believes that
the prospects for
realizing
fundamental
political goals are
_____ ______.
He/she believes that
the prospects for

valu
es

P3

P4

P5

Pred
icta
bilit
y of
polit
ical
futu
re

Beli
ef in
hist
oric
al
cont
rol

Rol
e of
Cha
nce

realizing
fundamental
political goals
aresomewhat
pessimistic. (-.25)
Takes into account the
dispersion of verbs.
Employs a measure of
dispersion, the Index of
Qualitative Variation
(IQV) which assesses the
variation in the distribution
of observations among the
six categories for self and
others.
Calculated separately for
self and other attributions,
the IQV scores is
subtracted from 1.0 to
estimate the predictability
of this value.

A series of proportion
indices measure the
leader’s beliefs
The number of self or other
attributions as a percentage
of the total number of self
or other attributions varies
between 0.0 and 1.0.

Calculated by multiplying
the leader’s scores for the
beliefs regarding
predictability of the
political future and the
degree of control over
historical development,
and subtracting the product
from one.

0.0 (Predictability) through 1.0
(Predictability)
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very
High)

0.0 (Control) through 1.0 (Control)
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very
High)

0.0 (Chance) through 1.0 (Chance)
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very
High)

The logic of the index is
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A leader’s beliefs
with scores of ___
attribute _______
predictability to
others and self.
A leader’s beliefs
with scores of .08
attribute very low
predictability to
others and self.

A leader with a
score of ____
believes that he/she
has a ____ degree
of control over
historical
development.
A leader with a
score of .47 believes
that he/she has a
medium degree of
control over
historical
development.
A leader with an
index of __
attributes a _____
role to chance.
A leader with an
index of .96
attributes a very
high role to chance.

that the higher the
predictability of the
political future and the
greater the leader’s belief
in his or her ability to
control historical
development, the less the
role of chance.
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APPENDIX B: DEBATE WINNERS AND LOSERS

79

Election
Year

1976

1980
1984
1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

Debate
Date
Septemb
er 26
October
6
October
22
Septemb
er 21
October
28

October
7
October
21
Septemb
er 25
October
13
October
11
October
15
October
19
October
6
October
16
October
3
October
11
October
17
Septemb
er 30
October
8
October
13

Winner

Loser(s)

Citation

Gerald Ford – R

Jimmy Carter – D

Schroeder – pg 101

Jimmy Carter – D

Gerald Ford - R

Schroeder – pg 101

Jimmy Carter – D

Gerald Ford - R

Ronald Reagan – R

John Anderson – I

Walter Mondale –
D

Ronald Reagan – R

Ronald Reagan – R
Ronald Reagan – R
George H. W. Bush
–R
George H. W. Bush
–R
Ross Perot – I; Bill
Clinton – D
Bill Clinton – D
Ross Perot – I

Bill Clinton – D

Jimmy Carter – D

Walter Mondale – D

Michael Dukakis – D
Michael Dukakis – D
George H. W. – R

Ross Perot – I; George
H. W. Bush – R
Bill Clinton – D; George
H. W. Bush
Bob Dole – R

Bill Clinton – D

Bob Dole – R

Al Gore – D

George W. Bush

George W. Bush – R

Al Gore – D

George W. Bush – R

Al Gore – D

John Kerry – D

George W. Bush – R

John Kerry – D

George W. Bush – R

Tie

Tie
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Schroeder – pg 101
Change and Continuity,
Pg 45, 1982
Change and Continuity,
Pg 45, 1982
Change and Continuity,
Pg 58, 1986
Change and Continuity,
Pg 60, 1986
Change and Continuity,
Pg 49, 1990
Change and Continuity,
Pg 50, 1990
Change and Continuity,
Pg 57, 1995
Change and Continuity,
Pg 60, 1995
Change and Continuity,
Pg 61, 1995
Change and Continuity,
Pg 35, 1999
Change and Continuity,
Pg 36, 1999
Change and Continuity,
Pg 37, 2003
Change and Continuity,
Pg 38, 2003
Change and Continuity,
Pg 38, 2003
Change and Continuity,
Pg 41, 2006
Change and Continuity,
Pg 41, 2006
Change and Continuity,
Pg 41, 2006

2008

2012

Septemb
er 26

Barack Obama – D

John McCain – R

October
7

Barack Obama – D

John McCain – R

October
15

Barack Obama – D

John McCain – R

October
3

Romney

Obama

October
16

Obama

Romney

October
22

Obama

Romney
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http://www.gallup.com/
poll/110779/DebateWatchers-Give-ObamaEdge-Over-McCain.aspx
http://www.gallup.com/
poll/111058/obamarated-winner-secondpresidential-debate.aspx
http://www.gallup.com/
poll/111256/obamaviewed-winner-thirddebate.aspx
http://fivethirtyeight.blo
gs.nytimes.com/2012/10
/04/polls-show-astrong-debate-forromney/
http://fivethirtyeight.blo
gs.nytimes.com/2012/10
/17/instant-reactionpolls-show-narrowobama-advantage-inseconddebate/?_php=true&_typ
e=blogs&_r=0
http://fivethirtyeight.blo
gs.nytimes.com/2012/10
/23/obama-unlikely-toget-big-debate-bouncebut-a-small-one-couldmatter/

APPENDIX C: LIST OF CANDIDATE CODES AND CORRESPONDING
DEBATES

Debate Date and Candidate
September 23, 1976 Carter
October 6, 1976 Carter
October 22, 1976 Carter
October 28, 1980 Carter
September 23, 1976 Ford
October 6, 1976 Ford
October 22, 1976 Ford
September 21, 1980 Reagan
October 28, 1980 Reagan
October 7, 1984 Reagan
October 21, 1984 Reagan
September 21, 1980 Anderson
October 7, 1984 Mondale
October 21, 1984 Mondale
September 25, 1988 Bush
October 13, 1988 Bush
October 11, 1992 Bush
October 15, 1992 Bush
October 19, 1992 Bush
September 25, 1988 Dukakis
October 13, 1988 Dukakis
October 11, 1992 Clinton
October 15, 1992 Clinton
October 19, 1992 Clinton
October 6, 1996 Clinton
October 16, 1996 Clinton
October 3, 2000 Bush
October 11, 2000 Bush
October 17, 2000 Bush
September 30, 2004 Bush
October 8, 2004 Bush
October 13, 2004 Bush
October 11, 1992 Perot
October 15, 1992 Perot
October 19, 1992 Perot
October 6, 1996 Dole
October 16, 1996 Dole
October 3, 2000 Gore
October 11, 2000 Gore
October 17, 2000 Gore
September 30, 2004 Kerry
October 8, 2004 Kerry
October 13, 2004 Kerry
September 26, 2008 Obama
October 7, 2008 Obama
October 15, 2008 Obama
October 3, 2012 Obama
October 16, 2012 Obama
October 22, 2012 Obama
September 26, 2008 McCain
October 7, 2008 McCain
October 15, 2008 McCain
October 3, 2012 Romney
October 16, 2012 Romney
October 22, 2012 Romney
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Code
Carter 1.1
Carter 1.2
Carter 1.3
Carter 2.1
Ford 1.1
Ford 1.2
Ford 1.3
Reagan 1.1
Reagan 1.2
Reagan 2.1
Reagan 2.2
Anderson 1.1
Mondale 1.1
Mondale 1.2
HW Bush 1.1
HW Bush 1.2
HW Bush 2.1
HW Bush 2.2
HW Bush 2.3
Dukakis 1.1
Dukakis 1.2
Clinton 1.1
Clinton 1.2
Clinton 1.3
Clinton 2.1
Clinton 2.2
W Bush 1.1
W Bush 1.2
W Bush 1.3
W Bush 2.1
W Bush 2.2
W Bush 2.3
Perot 1.1
Perot 1.2
Perot 1.3
Dole 1.1
Dole 1.2
Gore 1.1
Gore 1.2
Gore 1.3
Kerry 1.1
Kerry 1.2
Kerry 1.3
Obama 1.1
Obama 1.2
Obama 1.3
Obama 2.1
Obama 2.2
Obama 2.3
McCain 1.1
McCain 1.2
McCain 1.3
Romney 1.1
Romney 1.2
Romney 1.3
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APPENDIX D: MEAN SCORES COMPARISON TABLE – BY PARTY AND
YEAR
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Year

D1R2I3

P1

P2

P4

1976

1 Dem

.1933

.0333

.2167

.4400

.1933

2 Repub

.4600

.2767

.2467

.5600

.3300

Total

.3267

.1550

.2317

.5000

.2617

1 Dem

.5000

.3600

.1700

.3700

.1200

2 Repub

.2250

.0500

.2650

.3700

.1050

3 Indep

.2500

.1800

.3200

.5800

.1900

Total

.3000

.1600

.2550

.4225

.1300

1 Dem

.1400

.0350

.2850

.1650

.0350

2 Repub

.0650

-.0200

.3300

.3350

.1250

Total

.1025

.0075

.3075

.2500

.0800

1 Dem

.4600

.2250

.3350

.4300

.1750

2 Repub

.3100

.1050

.4200

.4850

.2050

Total

.3850

.1650

.3775

.4575

.1900

1 Dem

.4733

.2500

.3133

.5833

.2533

2 Repub

.3800

.1833

.3667

.2433

.0633

3 Indep

.4000

.2000

.2667

.4767

.1733

Total

.4178

.2111

.3156

.4344

.1633

1 Dem

.4450

.2450

.3300

.5400

.2600

2 Repub

.3900

.1900

.3650

.5400

.2300

Total

.4175

.2175

.3475

.5400

.2450

1 Dem

.2967

.1400

.3600

.5700

.2967

2 Repub

.4233

.2133

.3667

.5933

.2500

Total

.3600

.1767

.3633

.5817

.2733

1 Dem

.1767

.0667

.3600

.4133

.1833

2 Repub

.2033

.0767

.3367

.4267

.1867

Total

.1900

.0717

.3483

.4200

.1850

1 Dem

.2800

.1133

.3033

.2600

.0700

2 Repub

.4033

.1700

.3267

.1933

.0467

Total

.3417

.1417

.3150

.2267

.0583

1 Dem

.3467

.1533

.3200

.1367

.0433

2 Repub

.2767

.1067

.3600

.2433

.1233

Total

.3117

.1300

.3400

.1900

.0833

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

85

I1

I2

Total

1 Dem

.3156

.1456

.3076

.3940

.1672

2 Repub

.3238

.1435

.3373

.3938

.1665

3 Indep

.3625

.1950

.2800

.5025

.1775

Total

.3229

.1482

.3196

.4018

.1676
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APPENDIX E: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS FOR ALL OP.
CODE VALUES
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88

89

90

91

92

APPENDIX F: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS BY DEBATE

93

94

95

96

97

98

APPENDIX G:

MEAN COMPARISON TABLE OF OP. CODE SCORES BY
WINNER/LOSER OF PRESIDENCY AND YEAR
Report
Mean
Year

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004
2008

POTUS1

P1

P2

P4

I1

I2

1.0

.1933

.0333

.2167

.4400

.1933

2.0

.4600

.2767

.2467

.5600

.3300

Total

.3267

.1550

.2317

.5000

.2617

1.0

.3167

.1533

.2333

.3700

.1100

2.0

.2500

.1800

.3200

.5800

.1900

Total

.3000

.1600

.2550

.4225

.1300

1.0

.0650

-.0200

.3300

.3350

.1250

2.0

.1400

.0350

.2850

.1650

.0350

Total

.1025

.0075

.3075

.2500

.0800

1.0

.3100

.1050

.4200

.4850

.2050

2.0

.4600

.2250

.3350

.4300

.1750

Total

.3850

.1650

.3775

.4575

.1900

1.0

.4267

.2167

.3400

.4133

.1583

2.0

.4000

.2000

.2667

.4767

.1733

Total

.4178

.2111

.3156

.4344

.1633

1.0

.4450

.2450

.3300

.5400

.2600

2.0

.3900

.1900

.3650

.5400

.2300

Total

.4175

.2175

.3475

.5400

.2450

1.0

.4233

.2133

.3667

.5933

.2500

2.0

.2967

.1400

.3600

.5700

.2967

Total

.3600

.1767

.3633

.5817

.2733

1.0

.2033

.0767

.3367

.4267

.1867

2.0

.1767

.0667

.3600

.4133

.1833

Total

.1900

.0717

.3483

.4200

.1850

1.0

.2800

.1133

.3033

.2600

.0700

Yes2No

99

2012

Total

2.0

.4033

.1700

.3267

.1933

.0467

Total

.3417

.1417

.3150

.2267

.0583

1.0

.3467

.1533

.3200

.1367

.0433

2.0

.2767

.1067

.3600

.2433

.1233

Total

.3117

.1300

.3400

.1900

.0833

1.0

.3163

.1397

.3177

.3960

.1563

2.0

.3308

.1584

.3220

.4088

.1812

Total

.3229

.1482

.3196

.4018

.1676
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APPENDIX H: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS BY
WINNER/LOSER AND YEAR
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104
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APPENDIX I: ORIGINAL OP. CODE SCORES FOR ALL CANDIDATES
AND DEBATES

107
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